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Key points 
 
  The post-2015 welfare reforms will take almost £13bn a year from claimants by 2020-21. 
  This brings the cumulative loss since 2010 to £27bn a year – equivalent to £690 a year 
for every adult of working age. 
  The new reforms impact unevenly across the country.  Older industrial areas, less 
prosperous seaside towns, some London boroughs and a number of other towns are hit 
hardest.  By contrast, much of southern England a London escapes lightly. 
  At the extremes, Blackburn and Blackpool in Lancashire each lose £560 per working age 
adult as a result of the post-2015 reforms, compared to £150 in Guildford in Surrey, £140 
in Richmond upon Thames, and just £130 in Hart district in Hampshire. 
  15 of the 20 hardest-hit places have more than the GB average share of households with 
three or more dependent children. 12 of the 20 have a population of Asian ethnic origin 
exceeding 10 per cent. 
  As a general rule, the more deprived the local authority the greater the financial loss. 
  83 per cent of the loss from the post-2015 reforms – £10.7bn a year by 2020-21 – can be 
expected to fall on families with dependent children.  On average, couples with two or 
more dependent children lose £1,450 a year while lone parents with two or more lose 
£1,750 a year. 
  The post-2015 reforms hit working-age tenants in the social rented sector particularly 
hard – on average they can expect to lose almost £1,700 a year, compared to £290 a 
year for working-age owner occupiers. 
  Overall, £6.2bn a year of the financial loss arising from the post-2015 welfare reforms – 
just under half – is estimated to fall on working-age social sector households. 
  Parallel changes in tax, the minimum wage, social sector rents and childcare entitlement 
go some way to compensate but the winners and the losers are only sometimes the 
same people and it is unlikely that the full financial loss will be offset. 
  A key effect of welfare reform is to widen the gap in prosperity between the best and 
worst local economies across the country. 
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THE UNEVEN IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM 
The financial losses to places and people 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scope and purpose of the report 
 
Welfare reform has become a defining feature of contemporary UK government policy.  The 
benefit changes introduced by the Coalition government from 2010 onwards were 
substantial and central to its social and economic strategy.  Under its wholly Conservative 
successor, elected in May 2015, a second raft of welfare reform has already been initiated. 
 
All but a couple of the welfare reforms apply to the whole country.  The impact of the 
reforms, however, varies enormously from place to place, not least because benefit 
claimants are so unevenly spread across Britain.  The impact also falls unevenly on different 
types of household. 
 
It is to be expected that welfare reform will hit the poorest places hardest because they 
generally have large numbers of people reliant on benefits.  On the other hand, the reforms 
extend well beyond just those who are out-of-work to include significant swathes of the 
employed population as well.  So just how big is the impact on different places?  Just how 
much harder are the reforms hitting the poorer parts of Britain than more prosperous areas?  
And what sorts of households face the biggest losses? 
 
In a report published in 20131 we quantified the local and regional impact of the welfare 
reforms that were underway at that time.  The financial losses and the numbers affected 
were documented for each of Britain’s 379 local authority areas2.  The figures attracted wide 
attention and led to a series of follow-on reports looking in detail at the impact in Scotland3, 
Wales4, Northern Ireland5 and in our local base, Sheffield6. 
 
                                                          
1
 C Beatty and S Fothergill (2013) Hitting the Poorest Places Hardest: the local and regional impact of 
welfare reform, CRESR, Sheffield Hallam University 
2
 Unitary authorities and district councils, excluding Isles of Scilly 
3
 C Beatty and S Fothergill (2013) The Impact of Welfare Reform on Scotland.  C Beatty and S 
Fothergill (2014) The Local Impact of Welfare Reform.  C Beatty and S Fothergill (2015) The 
Cumulative Impact of Welfare Reform on Households in Scotland.  C Beatty, S Fothergill and D 
Houston (2015) The Impact of Welfare Reform on the Scottish Labour Market.  All published by the 
Scottish Parliament, Edinburgh. 
4
 C Beatty and S Fothergill (2014) The Impact of Welfare Reform on the Valleys, CRESR, Sheffield 
Hallam University 
5
 C Beatty and S Fothergill (2013) The Impact of Welfare Reform on Northern Ireland, NICVA, Belfast 
6
 C Beatty and S Fothergill (2015) The Impact of Welfare Reform on Communities and Households in 
Sheffield, CRESR, Sheffield Hallam University 
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This new report brings the story forward by including the welfare reforms announced since 
the May 2015 general election.  It also updates all the figures for the pre-2015 reforms to 
take account of the actual outturn.  This enables an assessment not only of the cumulative 
impact by the end of the present decade but also of how much has happened already and 
how much is still in the pipeline.  In the report itself a limited number of statistics are 
presented on the impact of each of the individual benefit reforms.  The full dataset, by benefit 
by authority, can be accessed at: 
http://www.shu.ac.uk/research/cresr/sites/shu.ac.uk/files/welfare-reform-2016.xlsx  
 
The report also includes wholly new figures on the impact of the post-2015 welfare reforms 
on different types of household and by housing tenure. 
 
All the figures in the report are estimates but in every case they are deeply rooted in official 
statistics – for example in the Treasury’s own estimates of the financial savings, the 
government’s Impact Assessments, and benefit claimant data. 
 
Welfare reform is a contentious issue and in documenting the impacts the report does not 
attempt to comment on the merits of each of the reforms.  However, it is important that the 
impact on different places is fully exposed because this is a key dimension that is too often 
overlooked.  The impact on different places is one of the yardsticks by which the reforms 
should be judged. 
 
 
The welfare reforms 
 
The figures in the report cover all the major welfare reforms implemented since 2010.  
Taking the pre-2015 reforms first, these are: 
 
 Housing Benefit – Local Housing Allowance 
Changes to the rules governing assistance with the cost of housing for low-income 
households in the private rented sector.  The new rules apply to rent levels, ‘excess’ 
payments, property size, age limits for sole occupancy and indexation for inflation. 
 
Housing Benefit – Under-occupation in the social rented sector 
New rules governing the size of properties for which payments are made to working 
age claimants (widely known, and referred to in the report, as the ‘bedroom tax’) 
  
Non-dependant deductions 
Increases in the deductions from Housing Benefit, Council Tax Support and other 
income-based benefits to reflect the contribution that non-dependant household 
members are expected to make towards the household’s housing costs 
 
Benefit cap 
New ceiling on total payments per household, applying to the sum of a wide range of 
benefits for working age claimants 
 
Council Tax Support 
Reductions in entitlement of working age claimants arising from 10 per cent reduction 
in total payments to local authorities  
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Personal Independence Payment 
Replacement of Disability Living Allowance by PIP for working age claimants, 
including more stringent and frequent medical tests, as the basis for financial support 
to help offset the additional costs faced by individuals with disabilities 
 
Employment and Support Allowance 
Replacement of Incapacity Benefit and related benefits by ESA, with more stringent 
medical tests, greater conditionality and time-limiting of non-means tested entitlement 
for claimants in the Work-Related Activity Group 
 
Child Benefit 
Three-year freeze, and withdrawal of benefit from households including a higher 
earner 
 
Tax Credits 
Reductions in payment rates and eligibility for Child Tax Credit and Working Tax 
Credit, paid to lower and middle income households 
 
1 per cent up-rating 
Limit in annual up-rating of value of most working age benefits 
 
A fuller description of each of these reforms, including the timing of implementation, is 
contained in the appendix to the report. 
 
The majority of these welfare reforms were initiated by the Coalition government in 
Westminster but the introduction of ESA was a Labour measure that pre-dated 2010 and 
only took full effect later, whereas the time-limiting of non-means tested ESA entitlement was 
a Coalition innovation.  The full impact of both the introduction and time-limiting of ESA is 
included here to provide a comprehensive view of the impact of the reforms implemented 
from 2010 onwards. 
 
By March 2016 nearly all these reforms had come into full effect.  The important exception is 
the changeover from DLA to PIP, which is not expected to be completed until March 20187.  
In quantifying the impact of welfare reform over the next five years, a substantial proportion 
of the impact of the introduction of PIP therefore has to be included alongside more recently 
announced measures. 
 
The new welfare reforms, announced by the Chancellor in July and November 2015, are: 
 
 Universal Credit tapers and thresholds 
Reduction in the level of earnings and increase in the rate at which Universal Credit 
awards are withdrawn.  This reform was originally to have applied to Tax Credits as 
well but will now only apply to Universal Credit, which is gradually replacing Tax 
Credits. 
 
 
                                                          
7
 HM Treasury, Budget 2013 
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 Tax Credits 
Reductions in payments and thresholds, notably the removal for new claims of the 
‘family’ element and a limit on the ‘child’ element to two children for children born 
after March 2017 
 
 Mortgage interest support 
 Change from welfare payment to a loan 
 
 ‘Pay to stay’ 
New requirement for higher-income tenants in the social rented sector in England to 
pay market rents, mandatory in local authority housing and voluntary for housing 
associations 
 
 LHA cap in the social rented sector 
 Housing Benefit in the social sector limited to the equivalent local private sector rate 
 
 Housing Benefit: 18-21 year olds 
 End of automatic entitlement for out-of-work 18-21 year olds 
 
 Employment and Support Allowance 
Reduction in payment to JSA rate for new claimants in the Work-Related Activity 
Group 
 
 Benefit cap 
Lower ceiling per household - £23,000 a year in London, £20,000 elsewhere – 
applying to total of wide range of working age benefits 
 
 Benefit freeze 
 Four-year freeze in the value of most working-age benefits 
 
Again, a fuller description of each of these new reforms, including the timing of 
implementation, is contained in the appendix. 
 
An astute observer will note the omission of the introduction of Universal Credit, which is 
scheduled to replace just about all means-tested working age benefits and is administratively 
the most ambitious reform of all.  However, the introduction of Universal Credit differs from 
the other reforms.  Putting aside the revised tapers and thresholds (whose impact is included 
here in full) the introduction of Universal Credit has by itself never been expected to lead 
directly to a reduction in spending. Universal Credit is best understood as a repackaging of 
existing benefits that for the first time introduces a consistent withdrawal rate, with the rules 
governing eligibility carried over from the existing benefits it replaces. Indeed, in the short-
run transitional relief increases spending. 
 
Ministers’ hope is that Universal Credit will reduce welfare spending by always making work 
financially worthwhile and raising employment.  However, the new tapers and thresholds 
mean that in practice, at the level of individuals and households, the losers from the 
transition to Universal Credit will now outnumber the winners. 
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A further omission is the reduction in social sector rents (by 1 per cent a year in England, for 
four years from 2016-17).  The Treasury estimates that this will save £1,445m a year by 
2020-21 but the full burden of the financial loss falls on social landlords not tenants.  The 
other welfare reforms documented here all impose losses on claimants.  A minority of 
tenants who do not claim Housing Benefit will actually benefit financially from this measure 
(see discussion towards the end of the report) but the loss of rental income to social 
landlords may lead to a reduction in services and the volume of new building. 
 
The list also omits the impact of benefit sanctions.  What needs to be remembered here is 
that the power to impose benefit sanctions is not new – it has been a feature of the benefit 
system since its inception.  What has happened since 2010 is that sanctions have been 
more widely applied, especially to those claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance, though the 
numbers and the rate do now appear to have peaked8.  The financial savings to the 
Treasury, though not negligible, are likely to be smaller than those arising from all but the 
most modest of the welfare reforms covered here9. 
 
 
Measuring the local and regional impacts 
 
The data sources and methods underpinning the local and regional estimates are set out in 
full in the appendix. 
 
The government does not produce estimates of the local impact of the reforms.  It does 
however publish a range of statistics that allow the local impact to be estimated.  This 
information principally comprises: 
  Treasury estimates of the anticipated saving arising from each element of the 
reforms, published in the Budget or in the government’s Autumn Statement 
  The Impact Assessments that government departments publish for most elements of 
the reforms 
  Claimant numbers and expenditure, by local authority, published by DWP and HMRC 
 
As far as possible, for each welfare reform the figures presented in the report take account 
of the overall financial saving to the Treasury, the distribution of claimants between local 
authorities, and the variation (if any) in the extent to which claimants in each authority are 
affected by the reforms10.  
                                                          
8
 See the quarterly briefings on the DWP sanctions statistics produced by David Webster of Glasgow 
University 
9
 Other reforms that have been omitted are the reduction in the qualifying age of the youngest child 
exempting lone parents from looking for work, which does not reduce payment rates, and the 
changeover from RPI to CPI for benefits up-rating, introduced in 2011-12, which is a wider accounting 
reform affecting public sector pensions for example and has in practice been superseded by 
subsequent caps and freezes for most working-age benefits.  New restrictions on Housing Benefit for 
claimants abroad for four weeks or more (saving: £10m a year by 2020-21) are also omitted. 
10
 The estimates here make no allowance for the small share of the financial impact falling on 
Northern Ireland.  The effect is to slightly overstate the impact on Great Britain, bearing in mind that 
Northern Ireland accounts for 3 per cent of the UK population. 
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For all the pre-2015 reforms, the financial savings have been up-dated.  This is sometimes 
because the Treasury itself has subsequently revised its estimates but in other cases it is 
because the outturn has proved different from what was originally anticipated.  Lower 
inflation, for example, reduced the savings from the uprating of benefits by just 1 per cent, 
and the reforms to incapacity benefits (Employment and Support Allowance) failed to deliver 
anything like the financial savings that were expected. 
 
In comparing the impact on different places, the report looks in particular at the financial loss 
per adult of working age11.  This is the best measure of the intensity of the hit and takes 
account of the number of claimants in each locality.  This is different to the financial loss 
facing each affected individual or household12.  A focus on adults of working age (16-64) is 
appropriate because the welfare reforms impact almost exclusively on this group.  By 
contrast, benefit claimants of pensionable age are largely unaffected13. 
 
In estimating the impact of the welfare reforms the report holds all other factors constant.  
What this means in practice is that it makes no assumptions about the growth of the 
economy or about future levels of employment and unemployment.  It also makes no 
assumptions about changes in claimant behaviour other than those already built in to the 
Treasury’s estimates of the financial saving.  So the figures in this report do not assume that 
loss of income from benefits will wholly or in part be replaced by additional income from 
employment. 
 
Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that estimation of the impacts is not a precise science.  
Even the Treasury itself has from time to time had to revise its expectations, or indeed 
simply got it wrong.  The figures here are all based on published estimates, official statistics 
and an informed appraisal of how each of the reforms can be expected to play out in 
different parts of the country. 
 
 
The overall national impact 
 
Impact up to March 2016 
 
Table 1 shows the financial loss arising from each of the pre-2015 welfare reform across 
Great Britain as a whole.  The first column shows the loss originally anticipated.  These are 
Treasury figures, with modest adjustments where appropriate14.  The second column shows 
the estimated annual loss to claimants by March 2016.  These are revised Treasury 
estimates, adjusted as appropriate in the light of outturn data15. 
  
                                                          
11
 ONS mid-year population estimates 2014 
12
 See Table 2 
13
 The main exceptions are small numbers in the private rented sector affected by the reforms to 
Housing Benefit, adults of pensionable age who receive Child Benefit, those in receipt of mortgage 
interest support, and tenants affected by the new LHA cap on Housing Benefit in the social rented 
sector.  The modest impact on pensioner households is documented in Table 10. 
14
 These are the figures published in C Beatty and S Fothergill (2013) Hitting the Poorest Places 
Hardest op. cit., except for PIP which is the forecast for 2015-16 from Budget 2011. 
15
 For reforms coming to full fruition by March 2015 the figures are the estimated losses in 2014-15 
rather than 2015-16. 
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Table 1: Estimated annual financial loss arising from welfare reform by March 2016 
  
Initial 
forecast 
£m p.a. 
Estimated 
outturn 
£m p.a. 
Tax Credits 3,660  4,210 
Child Benefit 2,845  3,030 
1 per cent uprating 3,430  2,700 
Housing Benefit: LHA 1,645  1,670 
Personal Independence Payments 1,450* 1,190 
Employment and Support Allowance 4,350  650 
Council Tax Support 340  370 
Housing Benefit: ‘bedroom tax’ 490  360 
Non-dependant deductions 340  210 
Benefit cap  270  100 
  
 
 
 Total  18,820 14,490 
  
 
 
 
*By 2015-16 
Source: HM Treasury and Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
 
 
There are important differences between what was originally anticipated and what by March 
2016 had proved to be the outturn.  Overall, the financial loss to claimants has been £4.3bn 
a year less than forecast.  The Treasury’s revised figures16 suggest a further loss, still in the 
pipeline, of £1,680m a year by March 2018 from the changeover to Personal Independence 
Payments, taking the total loss arising from PIP far above the first estimate in Budget 2010 
of £1,500m a year.   Additionally, in Scotland and Wales and a number of English local 
authorities the reduction in Council Tax Support has not been passed on to claimants, and in 
Scotland the impact of the ‘bedroom tax’ on claimants has been averted as well.  Even so, 
this still leaves the overall saving to the Treasury from all the pre-2015 reforms some £2.5bn 
a year short of the original anticipated figure. 
 
The reduction in spending on incapacity benefits – these days Employment and Support 
Allowance – accounts for by far the largest shortfall.  Three factors are at the root of this.  
First, the new medical test (the Work Capability Assessment) has reduced incapacity 
numbers by far less than was anticipated, in part because under political pressure the test 
itself has undergone successive revisions.  The headline number of incapacity claimants is 
only down by around 100,000 (to 2.5m), though it could be argued that without the new 
medical test the numbers would have been higher in the wake of recession.  Second, 
following the medical test a much smaller proportion of ESA claimants have been placed in 
the Work-Related Activity Group than was originally expected. Again, this is probably 
attributable in part to revisions to the Work Capability Assessment.  And third, as a result of 
the smaller than anticipated numbers in the Work-Related Activity Group, the financial 
savings to the Treasury arising from the time-limiting of non-means tested entitlement have 
been much less than was expected.  
                                                          
16
 HM Treasury, Budget 2013 
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Impact between 2016 and 2021 
 
Table 2 shows the additional financial losses to claimants that can be expected by 2020-21.  
These arise principally from the new round of welfare reforms, announced in the Summer 
Budget and Spending Review in 2015, but also include the impacts of the changeover to PIP 
that in March 2016 were still in the pipeline.  The financial losses shown here in the first 
column are all the Treasury’s own estimates. 
 
 
Table 2: Estimated additional financial loss arising from welfare reform by 2020-21 
  
Estimated 
          loss 
 £m p.a. 
 
Number of 
households or 
individuals(2) 
adversely affected 
Average loss per  
affected 
h'hold/individual 
 £ p.a. 
Benefit freeze 4,010 7,900,000 500 
Universal Credit tapers & thresholds 3,220 3,000,000 1,050 
Tax Credits 2,115 2,000,000 1,050 
Personal Independence Payments(1) 1,680 650,000 2,600 
Employment and Support Allowance 640 500,000 1,300 
Benefit cap 495 210,000 2,350 
Mortgage interest support 255 170,000 1,500 
‘Pay to stay’ 240 130,000 1,850 
LHA cap in social rented sector 225 300,000 750 
HB: 18-21 year olds 40 15,000 2,600 
    
Total 12,920 n.a. n.a. 
    
(1) Additional post-2015-16 impact of pre-2015 reform  
(2) Individuals for PIP, ESA and 18-21s; households for all other benefits 
Sources: HM Treasury, Impact Assessments and Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
 
 
By 2020-21, another £12.9bn a year is expected to be taken from claimants – only a little 
less than the £14.5bn a year lost by March 2016.  In financial terms, the pace of welfare 
reform is set to slacken very little. 
 
By early 2021, claimants are therefore expected to have lost a cumulative total of more than 
£27bn a year as a result of the welfare reforms implemented since 2010.  This is rather more 
than one pound in every four previously paid to working-age benefit claimants and 
equivalent to £690 a year for every adult of working age (claiming benefits or not) across the 
whole of Britain. 
 
In the coming period the four-year freeze in the value of most working age benefits is 
expected to deliver the biggest savings to the Treasury – and the largest loss to claimants – 
but the final amount will be sensitive to the rate of inflation: the higher inflation, the larger the 
loss to claimants.  The impact of the freeze is spread relatively thinly across a very large 
number of households.  
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The changes to the tapers and thresholds for the withdrawal of Universal Credit are also set 
to result in substantial losses but for fewer households, so the individual losses will be 
greater.  The government had originally intended to apply these changes to Tax Credits as 
well, from April 2016, but reversed this decision in the 2015 Spending Review in response to 
the House of Lords refusal to vote the measure through.  The plan has always been to 
integrate Tax Credits into Universal Credit so the effect has been to delay rather than avert 
the impact.  Transitional relief is included in Universal Credit for those who have no change 
in circumstances but by 2021 the vast majority of claimants will be no better off than if the 
changes had been applied immediately to Tax Credits. 
 
Among the other reforms, it is worth noting that the biggest financial losses attributable to the 
changeover to Personal Independence Payments are still to come17.  The losses arising 
from the introduction of ‘pay to stay’ are exclusively those affecting local authority tenants, 
for whom the change is mandatory, and will be larger if housing associations use their 
discretionary power to follow suit. 
 
The financial losses arising from the new, lower benefit cap are also expected to be much 
higher than from the cap that was introduced in 2013.  The Treasury’s estimate is that by 
2020-21 the total losses from the new cap will be roughly five times higher than the outturn 
for the pre-2016 benefit cap.  A loss of this magnitude is consistent with a ten-fold increase 
in the number of households subject to the cap.  This represents a step-change in the role of 
the benefit cap in the welfare system. 
 
The figures here and elsewhere in the report on the number of households or individuals 
affected are all a ‘snapshot’ at a single point in time.  Over time, as people move on or off 
benefit – there is always turnover – the numbers who at some point feel the financial impact 
of the reforms will be substantially larger.  Also, it is worth remembering that the numbers 
undergoing reassessment for PIP, for example, are much larger than those who eventually 
lose out financially.  Only a proportion are ‘adversely affected’ in the sense that they lose 
money but for the remainder the process of reassessment is still likely to be a source of 
stress and anxiety. 
 
Table 3 shows the scheduling of the financial losses, again using the Treasury’s own figures.  
The scale of the anticipated loss rises steadily over the coming five years, with particularly 
hefty increases in years two and three. 
 
In the period to March 2018 the biggest loss to claimants is anticipated to arise from the 
changeover to Personal Independence Payments – a pre-2015 reform rolling forward into 
the second half of the decade.  Thereafter, some of the other reforms, notably the benefit 
freeze, reductions in Tax Credits and the new Universal Credit tapers and thresholds are 
expected to take effect in a big way.  None of the housing-related reforms (the bottom four 
on the list in Table 3) are expected to deliver savings to the Treasury until 2017 and in some 
cases not until 2018. 
  
                                                          
17
 Until the autumn of 2015, PIP applied only to new claims, expiring time-limited claims and changes 
of circumstance.  The reassessment of on-going DLA claims has now started. 
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Table 3: Timing of additional financial losses arising from welfare reform, £m 
  
2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 
Benefit freeze 90 940 2,325 3,885 4,010 
UC tapers & thresholds 970 1,220 2,045 2,745 3,220 
Tax Credits 285 1,020 1,640 1,980 2,115 
PIP 810 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,680 
ESA 0 55 225 445 640 
Benefit Cap 100 310 360 405 495 
Mortgage interest support -30  -35 270 255 255 
‘Pay to stay’ 0 365 185 245 240 
LHA cap in social sector  0 0 120 170 225 
HB: 18-21 year olds 0 25 35 35 40 
      
Total 2,225 5,580 8,885 11,845 12,920 
      
% of 2020-21 total 17 43 69 92 100 
      
 
Source: HM Treasury 
 
 
Impact on local areas by March 2016 
 
Figure 1 shows the estimated financial loss by local authority up to March 2016.  All these 
losses result from the pre-2015 welfare reforms.  The measure used here is the loss per 
adult of working age so the data measures the intensity of the financial impact in each area. 
 
The impact by March 2016 presents a seemingly complex picture but there are clear 
patterns.  Three types of area have been hit hardest: 
  The older industrial areas of England, Scotland and Wales.  These include 
substantial parts of North West and North East England, the South Wales Valleys 
and the Glasgow area in Scotland.  Older industrial areas tend to have high numbers  
on out-of-work benefits and on low wages, which triggers Tax Credits and Housing 
Benefit as income top-ups. 
  A number of less prosperous seaside towns.  These too often have high numbers on 
out-of-work benefits and on low wages, and a large private-rented housing market 
which Housing Benefit reforms have hit hard 
  Some London boroughs.  Some of these are also relatively deprived, but high 
housing costs have inflated the losses arising from the Housing Benefit reforms in the 
private-rented sector. 
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Figure 1: Estimated loss arising from welfare reform by March 2016, by district 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data
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Table 4: Estimated financial loss arising from welfare reform by March 2016 
  
 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
 Loss per 
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
TOP 10 DISTRICTS 
 
BOTTOM 10 DISTRICTS 
 
 Blackpool  720  South Oxfordshire 220 
 Westminster  680  Winchester  220 
 Knowsley  560  South Northamptonshire  220 
 Brent  550  Wokingham  210 
 Middlesbrough  550  Aberdeenshire  210 
 Hastings  540  Guildford  210 
 Barking and Dagenham  540  Hart  210 
 Torbay  530  Aberdeen  210 
 Enfield  530  Shetland  200 
 Hartlepool  520  Cambridge  190 
  
 
      
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, a substantial part of southern England outside London has 
been much less acutely affected by the pre-2015 welfare reforms.  A number of rural areas 
in northern England, including most of North Yorkshire and parts of Cumbria, plus the 
Aberdeen area in Scotland, also escaped relatively lightly. 
 
Table 4 lists the local authorities with the largest and smallest financial losses18, per adult of 
working age, up to March 2016.  At the top of the list comes Blackpool, the famous seaside 
resort in North West England, where the average loss per working age adult is estimated to 
be £720 a year.  Blackpool tops the list for a number of reasons.  It has a high proportion of 
adults of working age out-of-work on benefits, including one of the highest incapacity 
claimant rates in the country.  It also has a high proportion of households living in the 
private-rented sector, who have been badly exposed to the reductions in the Local Housing 
Allowance element of Housing Benefit, and low wages in the local economy have inflated the 
numbers hit by the reductions in Tax Credits.  Westminster, at number two on the list, has 
been hard hit because extremely high rents mean that, more than anywhere else in Britain, 
the Housing Benefit reforms and the Benefit Cap have led to exceptionally large financial 
losses. 
 
Nevertheless, in all the worst affected local authorities the financial losses by March 2016 
are less than had been anticipated19, often by £150-200 per adult of working age.  In 
particular this is because the reduction in ESA numbers and spending has been far less than 
expected.  The worst affected districts have nevertheless still experienced losses that are 
typically two-and-a-half to three times higher, per adult of working age, than the least 
affected districts.  
                                                          
18
 Excluding City of London (the financial district) which has a very small population 
19
 See C Beatty and S Fothergill (2013) Hitting the Poorest Places Hardest, op. cit. 
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Anticipated local impact 2016-21 
 
Figure 2 shows the estimated financial loss, by local authority, anticipated to arise by 2020-
21 from the post-2015 welfare reforms.  Again, the measure used here is the loss per adult 
of working age so the data measures the intensity of the financial impact in each area.  
Table 5 lists the 50 local authority districts anticipated to experience the largest financial loss 
and contrasts this with the 20 least affected20. 
 
As in the period up to 2016, older industrial areas figure prominently among the hardest-hit 
places.  So do a number of less prosperous seaside towns and London boroughs.  But the 
new round of welfare reform also hits hard in a number of places such as Leicester, 
Peterborough and Luton that have generally robust local economies with relatively low levels 
of unemployment. 
 
What the local impact of the post-2015 welfare reforms illustrates is that the new benefit cuts 
are not confined just to those who are out of work.  Tax Credit changes and Universal Credit 
tapers and thresholds mainly impact on those in work on low and middle incomes.  The 
introduction of ‘pay to stay’ in social housing impacts almost exclusively on those in work.  
And because some of the new reforms impact on large families – the Tax Credit changes 
and the lower Benefit Cap for example – the places that have above-average numbers of 
large families are amongst the worst-hit this time round. 
 
Blackburn, at the top of the list of hard-hit areas, illustrates this point.  Blackburn is an older 
industrial area with a relatively high out-of-work claimant rate but what pushes it to the top is 
that it is estimated to be the worst-hit place in Britain by the reductions to Tax Credits and 
the second-worst hit by the new Universal Credit tapers and thresholds.  This reflects low 
wages in employment and Blackburn’s high proportion of households with three or more 
dependent children – 8.4 per cent compared to the GB average of 4.6 per cent21.  Blackburn 
is also estimated to be the fourth worst-hit place by the revised Benefit Cap, again a 
reflection in part of family size. 
 
Of the 20 hardest-hit local authorities, 15 have more than the GB average share of 
households with three or more dependent children22.  In 12 of the hardest hit 20 – often the 
same places – the share of the population of Asian ethnic origin also exceeds 10 per cent23. 
 
What the estimates of the local impact of the post-2015 reforms also illustrate is that a 
different package of reform generates a different geography.  Nowhere illustrates this better 
than the London borough of Westminster, estimated to have had the second-highest 
financial losses (per adult of working age) in Britain up to March 2016, primarily as a result of 
the reforms to Housing Benefit in the private rented sector.  Looking at the post-2015 
reforms, Westminster ranks 290 (out of 378) in terms of the estimated financial loss. 
 
  
                                                          
20
 Excluding City of London 
21
 Source: 2011 Census of Population 
22
 The exceptions are Blackpool, Knowsley, Thanet, Hastings, Merthyr Tydfil and Hull 
23
 The exceptions are Blackpool, Knowsley, Middlesbrough, Thanet, Hastings, Merthyr Tydfil, Hull and 
Stoke-on Trent.  Source: 2011 Census of Population. 
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Figure 2: Anticipated loss by 2020-21 arising from post-2015 welfare reforms, by district 
 Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data   
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Table 5: Anticipated loss by 2020-21 arising from post-2015 welfare reforms, by district 
 
  
 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
  Loss per 
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
 TOP 50 DISTRICTS 
 
 (cont) 
 
1. Blackburn with Darwen 560 40. South Tyneside 420 
2. Blackpool 560 41. Tameside 420 
3. Barking and Dagenham 530 42. Tendring 420 
4. Bradford 510 43. Barnsley 420 
5. Knowsley 500 44. Rhondda Cynon Taf 420 
6. Sandwell 500 45. Liverpool 420 
7. Oldham 490 46. Doncaster 410 
8. Birmingham 490 47. Hackney 410 
9. Leicester 490 48. Salford 410 
10. Middlesbrough 490 49. West Dunbartonshire 410 
11. Burnley 490 50. North East Lincolnshire 410 
12. Thanet 490    
13. Hyndburn 480  BOTTOM 20 DISTRICTS 
 14. Pendle 470 359. Mid Sussex 170 
15. Rochdale 470 360. South Cambridgeshire 170 
16. Hull 470 361. East Hampshire 170 
17. Merthyr Tydfil  470 362. Windsor and Maidenhead 170 
18. Stoke-on-Trent 470 363. Runnymede 170 
19. Hastings 470 364. Rutland 170 
20. Newham 460 365. Cambridge 170 
21. Peterborough 460 366. Shetland 160 
22. Enfield 450 367. Chiltern 160 
23. Torbay 450 368. Epsom and Ewell 160 
24. Wolverhampton 450 369. South Northamptonshire 160 
25. Great Yarmouth 450 370. Mole Valley 150 
26. Luton 450 371. South Oxfordshire 150 
27. Blaenau Gwent 450 372. Elmbridge 150 
28. Bolton 440 373. Surrey Heath 150 
29. Walsall 440 374. Guildford 150 
30. Neath Port Talbot 440 375. Wokingham 150 
31. Corby 440 376. South Buckinghamshire 140 
32. Hartlepool 430 377. Richmond upon Thames 140 
33. Manchester 430 378. Hart 130 
34. Mansfield 430    
35. Boston 430    
36. Nottingham 420    
37. Caerphilly 420    
38. Glasgow 420    
39. Denbighshire 420    
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data  
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Again, much of southern England outside London escapes lightest.  With the notable 
exception of the Shetland Islands, all the 20 districts least affected by the post-2015 welfare 
reforms are within a hundred mile radius of London. 
 
Table 6 summarises the impact by region.  The North East and North West are hit hardest, 
and Wales, the West Midlands and Yorkshire are not far behind.  The South West, East and 
South East are the least severely affected. 
 
 
Table 6: Anticipated loss by 2020-21 arising from post-2015 welfare reforms, by region 
  
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 North West   1,710 380 
 North East  620 380 
 Wales  720 370 
 West Midlands  1,310 370 
 Yorkshire and the Humber  1,230 360 
 East Midlands  970 330 
 London  1,870 320 
 Scotland  1,100 320 
 South West  980 290 
 East  1,040 280 
 South East  1,390 250 
  
  
 Great Britain  12,920 320
  
  
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
 
 
 
The cumulative impact 
 
The new welfare reforms come on top of reforms that have been implemented since 2010.  
Figure 3 shows the cumulative local impact by local authority across Britain.  The data here 
is the estimated financial loss in 2020-21, per adult of working age, arising from all the pre 
and post-2015 reforms. 
 
As the summation of the impacts in the two sub-periods, this map reinforces the point that it 
is older industrial areas, poorer seaside towns and a number of London boroughs, plus a 
handful of other towns, that are hit hardest while much of southern England around London 
escapes lightly. 
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Figure 3: Anticipated loss by 2020-21 arising from all pre and post-2015 welfare reforms, by 
district 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data   
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Table 7: Anticipated loss by 2020-21 arising from all pre and post-2015 welfare reforms 
  
 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
 Loss per 
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
TOP 10 DISTRICTS 
 
BOTTOM 10 DISTRICTS 
 
Blackpool 1,270 Rutland 390 
Knowsley 1,070 Mole Valley 380 
Blackburn with Darwen 1,070 South Oxfordshire 370 
Barking and Dagenham 1,060 South Northamptonshire 370 
Middlesbrough 1,040 South Buckinghamshire 370 
Hastings 1,010 Guildford 360 
Thanet 1,000 Shetland 360 
Burnley 1,000 Wokingham 360 
Torbay 990 Cambridge 350 
Hyndburn 980 Hart 340 
  
 
      
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Anticipated loss by 2020-21 arising from all pre and post-2015 welfare reforms, by 
region 
  
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
North West  3,600 790 
North East 1,300 790 
Wales 1,450 770 
West Midlands 2,650 750 
Yorkshire and the Humber 2,550 750 
London 4,250 730 
East Midlands 2,000 680 
Scotland 2,200 640 
South West 2,100 630 
East 2,200 600 
South East 3,100 560 
  
  
Great Britain  27,400 690 
  
  
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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Table 7 lists the local authorities with the largest and smallest estimated financial loss over 
the full period24.  Two points are worth noting here.  First, by 2020-21 the loss in a number of 
places is estimated to exceed £1,000 a year per adult of working age.  Second, the districts 
with the largest losses are typically hit three times harder than those with the smallest 
losses. 
 
Table 8 shows the losses over the full period by region.  This underlines the point once again 
that southern England outside London is escaping lightest. 
 
 
The relationship to deprivation 
 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the estimated financial loss from the post-2015 
welfare reforms (per adult of working age) and the scale of deprivation in each local 
authority.  The deprivation measure used here is the share of local neighbourhoods25 in the 
worst 20 per cent nationally.  To overcome inconsistencies between the separate deprivation 
indices for the constituent countries of the UK, the deprivation figures here are taken from 
research that re-works the data to produce statistics for the UK as a whole26. 
 
 
Figure 4: Relationship between deprivation and anticipated financial loss in 2020-21 from post-
2016 welfare reforms, by local authority 
 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates and University of Cambridge 
                                                          
24
 Excluding City of London 
25
 Lower Super Output Areas in England and Wales, Datazones in Scotland. 
26These particular statistics have been generated by Matthew Barclay and Rupert Payne of the 
University of Cambridge who have kindly made available their most up to date figures based on the 
most recent published Indices for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  For details of their 
methods see R Payne and G Abel (2012) ‘UK indices of multiple deprivation – a way to make 
comparisons across constituent countries easier’, Health Statistics Quarterly, vol 53, pp 1-16. 
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There is a clear and unambiguous relationship: as a general rule, the more deprived the 
local authority, the greater the financial hit.  Overall, for every ten percentage point increase 
in the share of neighbourhoods in the most deprived 20 per cent, the scale of the financial 
loss arising from the welfare reforms rises by roughly £48 a year per adult of working age. 
 
 
The impact by household type 
 
Table 9 lists the types of individuals and households most likely to face a reduction in 
income as a result of each of the post-2015 reforms.  A key point about these reforms, like 
their predecessors, is that they often impact simultaneously on the same individuals and  
 
 
Table 9: Groups typically most affected by post-2015 welfare reforms 
 
PERSONAL INDEPENDENCE PAYMENT (post-March 2016 impact)  Existing Disability Living Allowance claimants undergoing reassessment  Less severely disabled of working age, mostly older, mostly out-of-work 
 
UNIVERSAL CREDIT TAPERS AND THRESHOLDS  Low-income households in work 
 
TAX CREDITS (new reforms)  Low to middle income families, including households in work and out of work  Larger families, especially those having a third or additional child 
 
MORTGAGE INTEREST SUPPORT  Long-term out-of-work households with a mortgage , including those on ESA  Some retirees 
 
‘PAY TO STAY’  Higher income social housing tenants in England, mostly in work, especially in areas with high 
market rents 
 
LHA CAP IN SOCIAL RENTED SECTOR  Out-of-work and low income social housing tenants, but not in all cases (depending on local 
rent levels and property type) 
 
HOUSING BENEFIT: 18-21 YEAR OLDS  Young unemployed not living with parents 
 
EMPLOYMENT AND SUPPORT ALLOWANCE (new reform)  Out-of-work, mainly older adults with less severe health problems or disabilities  New claimants only 
 
BENEFIT CAP (extension)  Larger out-of-work families  Out-of-work households in areas with high housing costs 
 
BENEFIT FREEZE  Everyone on the main working age benefits (JSA, ESA, IS, HB(LHA), UC, Tax Credits, 
Child Benefit) 
 
Source: Impact Assessments 
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households.  In-work households on low income, for example, may lose out through both the 
changes in Tax Credits and, at a later point, the new tapers and thresholds in Universal 
Credit, and the benefit freeze applies too.  Similarly, an out-of-work individual with health 
problems or disabilities may face both a loss of income from PIP and a reduction in ESA. 
 
Table 10 shows the average loss arising from the post-2015 welfare reforms for each of 15 
different household types.  The figures show the estimated loss in 2020-21 when this new 
round of reform has come to full fruition. 
 
The financial losses in this table are based on the Treasury’s estimated savings, information 
in the Impact Assessments, statistics on the proportion of each household type receiving 
each benefit and, where necessary, plausible assumptions about the likely impact of 
different elements of the reform package.  The detailed methods are set out in the appendix. 
 
It is important to underline that the figures are averages across the whole stock of 
households of each type, not just those hit by the welfare reforms.  Thus the modest loss for 
couples with no children, for example, averages substantial losses for some households 
together with large numbers of other couples who are entirely unaffected by the welfare 
reforms. 
 
 
Table 10: Anticipated loss in 2020-21 from post-2015 welfare reforms, by household type 
  
Number of 
households of 
each type, GB, 
millions, 2011 
Average 
financial loss 
£ p.a. 
Pensioner couple  2.1 40 
Single pensioner  3.2 40 
Couple – no children  4.5 200 
Couple – one dependent child  2.0 900 
Couple – two or more dependent children  2.9 1,450 
Couple – all children non-dependent  1.6 200 
Lone parent – one dependent child  1.0 1,400 
Lone parent – two or more dependent children  0.8 1,750 
Lone parent – all children non-dependent 0.9 250 
Single person working age household  4.7 250 
Other – with one dependent child  0.3 1,130 
Other – with two or more dependent children 0.3 1,360 
Other – all full-time students 0.2 0 
Other – all aged 65+  0.1 50 
Other  1.1 300 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Sources: Census of Population and Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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Table 11: Estimated loss in 2020-21 arising from each post-2015 welfare reform, by household type, £m a year 
  
PIP 
UC tapers 
and 
thresholds 
Tax 
Credits 
Mortgage 
Interest 
Support 
'Pay 
to 
stay' 
LHA 
cap in 
social 
sector 
HB: 
18-21 
year 
olds ESA 
Benefit 
Cap 
Benefit 
freeze Total 
Pensioner couple 0  20  0  45  0  15  0  0  0  10 80  
Single pensioner 0  0  0  70  0  20  0  0  0  40 130  
Couple no children 415  70  2  5  75  30  0  130  10  230 970  
Couple 1 child 115  550  200  35  25  15  0  50  50  800 1,830  
Couple 2 or more children 235  1,050  1,470  50  35  25  0  60  75  1,220 4,220  
Couple all children non-dependent 145  20  1  2  25  10  0  45  2  80 340  
Lone parent 1 child 95  620  110  15  5  25  0  40  130  430 1,470  
Lone parent 2 or more children 85  500  220  15  5  20  0  25  200  330 1,400  
Lone Parent all children non-dependent 75  10  0  1  15  5  0  35  2  80 230  
Single person working age household 375  70  0  5  5  30  20  190  10  420 1,130  
Other - with one dependent child 25  140  30  5  10  5  0  15  5  130 370  
Other - with two or more dependent children 25  160  80  5  10  5  0  15  5  130 440  
Other- all full-time students 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 0  
Other - all aged 65+ 0  0  0  2  0  1  0  0  0  1 3  
Other 90  20  0  1  25  20  20  45  2  100 320  
            Total 1,680  3,220  2,115  255  240  225  40  640  495  4,010 12,920  
                        
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data  
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The striking feature is the uneven impact of the welfare reforms.  Pensioner households are 
little affected – this was always built-in to the design of the reforms, which are targeted at the 
working age to encourage employment.  At the other end of the spectrum, households with 
dependent children lose substantial sums – from an average of £900 a year for a couple with 
one dependent child through to £1,750 a year for a lone parent with two or more dependent 
children.  Again, these are averages that will hide important differences between individual 
households, depending on their circumstances.  Just as some households with dependent 
children will lose significantly less than these averages, others will lose substantially more, 
perhaps much more. 
 
To understand why families with dependent children can be expected to lose large sums 
from the welfare reforms, Table 11 disaggregates the loss by household type into its 
component parts.  This shows that it is the changes to Tax Credits, the new Universal Credit 
tapers and thresholds, and the benefit freeze that hit families with dependent children 
hardest.  Lone parents with dependent children can also be expected to be hit hard by the 
new, lower Benefit Cap.  By contrast, couples without dependent children, who are often a 
somewhat older group, can expect to lose most from the replacement of Disability Living 
Allowance by Personal Independence Payments, a pre-2015 reform that is still some way off 
full implementation. 
 
In total, by 2020-21 an estimated loss of £10.7bn a year can be expected to fall on families 
with dependent children.  This is 83 per cent of the overall financial loss arising from the 
post-2015 welfare reforms. 
 
 
The impact by housing tenure 
 
Table 12 divides the financial loss by housing tenure.  The figures show the estimated 
annual loss in 2020-21 arising from the new round of reforms, including the post-March 2016 
impact of the changeover to Personal Independence Payments.  As with the estimates by 
household type, the losses in this table are based on the Treasury’s estimated savings, 
information in the Impact Assessments, statistics on the proportion of each tenure group 
receiving each benefit and, where necessary, plausible assumptions about the likely impact 
of different element of the reform package.  The detailed methods are set out in the 
appendix. 
 
 
Table 12: Anticipated loss in 2020-21 arising from post-2015 welfare reforms, by tenure 
  
Number of 
households, GB, 
millions, 2011 
Average loss per 
household 
£ p.a. 
Average loss 
per working 
age household 
£ p.a. 
Social rented sector  4.7 1,330 1,690 
Private rented sector 4.5 710 730 
Owner occupied 16.3 230 290 
 
 
  
   
 
 
Sources: Census of Population and Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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The table provides two measures of the average loss per household in each sector – across 
all households, and per working age household27.  Of these, the second is the more 
revealing because nearly all the financial loss from the welfare reforms falls on working age 
households, as Table 10 demonstrated earlier, and because pensioner households are 
unevenly spread across the three sectors. 
 
The striking feature here is the estimated scale of the loss to working-age households in the 
social rented sector – on average, almost £1,700 a year, or more than five times as much as 
the average loss to working-age owner-occupiers.  Once again it is important to emphasise 
that some households in the social rented sector will lose less than this average amount 
while others can be expected to lose considerably more. 
 
Table 13 shows how much each of the post-2015 reforms contributes to the financial loss to 
working age households in the social rented sector.  The introduction of ‘pay to stay’ and the 
Local Housing Allowance cap in the social rented sector and have attracted the attention of 
social landlords and tenants.  However, across the post-2015 reforms as a whole, by 2020-
21 the biggest sources of financial loss are likely to be the benefit freeze, the new Universal 
Credit tapers and thresholds, changes to tax credits and the on-going replacement of 
Disability Living Allowance by Personal Independence Payments.  Some of these losses, 
such as those resulting from the benefit freeze, are spread thinly across large numbers of 
households; others have a bigger impact on a smaller proportion of social sector tenants. 
 
 
Table 13: Anticipated loss in 2020-21 to working-age households in the social rented sector 
arising from post-2015 welfare reforms 
  
£m p.a. 
 Benefit freeze 2,250 
 UC tapers and thresholds 1,300 
 Tax credits 850 
 Personal Independence Payments 750 
 Employment and Support Allowance 310 
 Benefit Cap 280 
 ‘Pay to stay’ 240 
 LHA cap in social rented sector 190 
 HB: 18-21 year olds 20 
 Mortgage interest support 0 
  
 
 Total  6,200
  
 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
  
                                                          
27
 Defined here as any household with at least one adult of working age (16-64). The financial loss 
falling on pensioner households is excluded. 
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By 2020-21, the £240m loss attributable to ‘pay to stay’ is actually expected to be less than 
in 2017-18, when the policy is introduced, at which point the Treasury expects savings to 
peak at £365m28 and 200,000 households are likely to be affected29.  The Treasury’s 
expectation is that following the introduction of ‘pay to stay’ behavioural change will begin to 
kick in as households take advantage of right to buy or move out.  Conversely, the effect of 
the LHA cap in the social rented sector will escalate well beyond 2020-21 because the policy 
only applies to new tenancies signed after 1 April 2016.  Over time, the number of tenancies 
affected by the cap will therefore increase, in all likelihood to 2030 and beyond. 
 
Overall, by 2020-21, £6.2bn a year of the £12.9bn a year financial loss arising from the post-
2015 welfare reforms – just under half – is estimated to fall on working age social sector 
households. 
 
Figure 5 shows the estimated financial loss to working age households in the social rented 
sector by local authority.  Once again, these figures are averages that will disguise a wide 
range of impacts at the level of individual households.  The map shows the loss in 2020-21 
from all the post-2015 welfare reforms, including the post-March 2016 impact of the 
changeover to PIP.  The figures for each local authority take account of the estimated loss 
from each reform in each authority, the national share of the loss from each reform falling on 
social sector households, and the scale of the social sector in each authority.  Additionally, 
the figures take specific account of the financial losses falling on larger families and the 
variation between local authorities in their housing tenure.  The detailed methods are set out 
in the appendix. 
 
 
Table 14: Anticipated loss in 2020-21 to working-age households in the social rented sector 
arising from post-2015 welfare reforms: 20 worst-affected districts 
  
 
Loss per  
working age 
household 
£ p.a. 
 Loss per 
working age 
household 
£ p.a. 
Newham 2,740 Oldham 2,420 
Barking and Dagenham 2,670 Middlesbrough 2,400 
Enfield 2,610 Burnley 2,360 
Leicester 2,600 Knowsley 2,350 
Blackpool 2,570 Merthyr Tydfil  2,350 
Luton 2,570 Thanet 2,340 
Birmingham 2,530 Boston 2,330 
Sandwell 2,500 Brent 2,320 
Blackburn with Darwen 2,500 Peterborough 2,290 
Bradford 2,440 Hull 2,290 
  
 
  
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
 
  
                                                          
28
 HM Treasury, Summer Budget 2015 
29
 CLG Housing and Planning Bill 2015/16: impact assessment) 
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Figure 5: Anticipated loss in 2020-21 to working age households in the social rented sector 
arising from post-2015 welfare reforms, by district  
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data   
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The now familiar pattern is that the biggest losses are in older industrial areas, less 
prosperous seaside towns, poorer London boroughs and a handful of other towns.  In the 
worst-hit places, shown in Table 14, the losses are typically around £2,500 per household 
per year.  Social sector households in much of southern England around London, and in 
parts of rural northern England and Scotland, generally face smaller losses though even 
here the average loss is generally at least £1,000 a year per household. 
 
 
Will the loss of income be offset? 
 
Welfare reform is of course only one of several things happening simultaneously.  It is not 
within the scope of the present report to cover all these in detail but the extent to which the 
financial losses might be offset, at least for some people, deserves comment. 
 
The increase in personal tax allowances is one offsetting factor.  Over the 2010-15 period, 
the Coalition government increased the personal allowance for Income Tax by more than the 
rate of inflation.  In its 2015 Summer Budget, the Conservative government pledged to 
increase the allowance from £10,600 in 2015-16 to £12,500 by 2020-21. 
 
Two points are worth bearing in mind about the impact of changes in personal allowances.  
The first is that only a proportion of benefit claimants actually pay Income Tax.  Those in full-
time employment will typically do so but there are many others – especially women – in low-
paid part-time employment who have an income below tax thresholds.  Those on out-of-work 
benefits will generally be in this position too.  The other point is the scale of the tax changes.  
Raising the personal allowance by £1,900 a year between 2015-16 and 2020-21 is worth 
£380 a year to the individual taxpayer (at a 20 per cent tax rate), but around half of this 
increase might have been expected anyway if the allowance had been uprated in line with 
inflation30. 
 
The introduction of the National Living Wage is a second offsetting factor.  From April 2016 
this is £7.20 an hour for workers aged 25 or more – an increase of 70p compared to the 
previous minimum wage – and it is the government’s aspiration to raise the National Living 
Wage to over £9 an hour by 2020.  In the short-run the government expects this to boost the 
earnings of 2.7m low wage workers, with knock-on effects further up the wage distribution for 
perhaps a further 3.25m31. 
 
Whilst the introduction of the National Living Wage boosts earnings of the low paid, revised 
tapers and thresholds in Universal Credit increase the withdrawal of financial support from 
many of the same people.  On balance, many of the low paid are likely to find that they are 
little if at all better off.  Illustrative figures in Summer Budget 2015 suggest that the combined 
effect of welfare reform, personal tax changes and the National Living Wage will be to 
generate a range of both positive and negative changes in real income by 2020-21, 
depending on household structure and hours worked (if any). 
 
                                                          
30
 Office for Budget Responsibility inflation forecast in Summer Budget 2015 
31
 Source: HM Treasury (2015) Summer Budget 2015, op. cit. 
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A third offsetting factor is the reduction in social sector rents, by one per cent a year in 
England for four years from 2016-17.  The Treasury counts this as a ‘welfare reform’ 
because the effect is to reduce payments to social sector tenants who claim Housing 
Benefit.  However, unlike the other welfare reforms the claimant does not end up worse off.  
It is the social sector landlord – a council or housing association – that bears the burden. 
 
There is a group of social sector tenants who do not claim Housing Benefit who will end up 
better-off as a result of lower rents, and some of these will be households in receipt of 
benefits that have been reduced or frozen.  These households account for just over a third of 
the 3.9m social sector tenants in England32.  The government expects the rent reduction to 
benefit this group by £12 a week by 2020-21, or just over £600 a year each33, an overall 
increase in disposable income to the group approaching £900m a year.  Offsetting this gain, 
however, the widening gap between social sector and market rents that will result from the 
rent reduction means that higher-income tenants may face even bigger payments under the 
new ‘pay to stay’ arrangements. 
 
For some claimants, Discretionary Housing Payments are a fourth offsetting factor.  
These are payments administered by local authorities to vulnerable household badly 
affected by the welfare changes – for example by the Benefit Cap.  In the Summer Budget 
2015, the government made available £800m for this purpose. 
 
Two points need to be noted about Discretionary Housing Payments.  First, the 
government’s financial allocation is for a five year period, so on an annual basis it averages 
only £160m.  This compares to expected annual losses to claimants in 2020-21 of £495m 
from the new, lower Benefit Cap alone.  Second, Discretionary Housing Payments are 
intended to be a temporary payment to households34, whereas the welfare reforms represent 
a permanent, on-going loss of entitlement. 
 
A fifth offsetting factor is the extension of free childcare.  From September 2017, 
entitlement is being increased from 15 to 30 hours a week for working parents of 3 and 4 
year olds.  The increase is worth up to £2,500 a year per child35.  Tax-free childcare up to 
the value of £2,000 per child is also being introduced from early 2017.  The net cost to the 
Exchequer of the recently-announced changes, including restrictions on the entitlement of 
the highest-earners, is estimated to be £585m a year in 2020-2136. 
 
For some households these reductions in childcare costs are substantial and they will go a 
long way towards offsetting, perhaps even entirely, the loss of income arising from the 
welfare reform package.  On the other hand it is worth bearing in mind that the total 
estimated loss to households with dependent children arising from welfare reform is 
estimated to be £10.7bn a year by 2020-21 (see Table 11 earlier).  Also, at least some of the 
financial benefit of the reduction in childcare costs will feed through to middle and upper-
                                                          
32
 Source: English Housing Survey 2013-14 
33
 DWP (2015) Welfare Reform and Work Bill: impact assessment of social rent reductions 
34
 An exception is the Scottish Government’s use to date of Discretionary Housing Payments to offset 
the ‘bedroom tax’ 
35
 Source: Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015 
36
 Sources: Summer Budget 2015 and Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015 
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income households in work who do not draw on the benefit system to any significant extent 
and are largely unaffected by the welfare reforms. 
 
Taken as a whole, all these parallel changes in taxation, wages and entitlement go some 
way to offsetting the financial losses arising from welfare reform.  However, it is clear that the 
winners and the losers are unlikely to be the same people.  It also looks unlikely that the full 
financial loss will be offset in this way. 
 
 
Will more people find employment? 
 
Westminster ministers take the view that the welfare reforms increase the financial incentive 
to take up employment and because more people will look for work more people will find 
work.  In this view, employment will be higher and the loss of benefit income will be offset in 
whole or in part by an increase in earnings. 
 
What is true is that since 2012, at around the time that many of the first round of welfare 
reforms began to bite, UK employment has grown strongly – more strongly indeed than 
normal given the modest growth in output.  It would be wrong, however, to assume that 
welfare reform has been the trigger.  Other factors almost certainly lie at the root of the 
upturn – the revival in household borrowing, especially around the housing market, the 
recovery of the world economy and exceptionally low interest rates for example. The reforms 
to out-of-work benefits do however increase the financial incentive to work. 
 
On the other hand, even before the reforms began most out-of-work claimants would have 
been financially better off in employment.  Financial disincentives only came into play for 
relatively small numbers at specific cut-off points in the system.  Moreover, some reforms to 
in-work benefits – the changes to Universal Credit tapers and thresholds for example – tend 
to have the opposite effect, making work less financially rewarding, and many in employment 
may find it difficult to increase their working hours to offset the loss of income. 
 
For claimants of Employment and Support Allowance, who are by far the largest group on 
out-of-work benefits, it is also questionable whether increasing the financial incentive to work 
really addresses their obstacles to employment.  For some ESA claimants health problems 
or disabilities pose a formidable barrier, and even for those closer to the labour market there 
are generally unresolved health issues.  Additionally, ESA claimants are disproportionately 
concentrated in the weaker local labour markets up and down the country, where employers 
are generally able to recruit plenty of fit and healthy workers. 
 
Central to the view that employment will rise in the wake of the welfare reforms is the 
assumption that extra labour supply leads to extra labour demand from employers.  Whether 
labour markets really do work in this way is deeply questionable.  There are times and 
places where a shortage of labour can bottle-up economic growth but particularly where the 
local economy is weak – which is where so many out-of-work claimants are concentrated – 
the likelihood of an increase in labour supply triggering an increase in employment is low.  
Some individuals will undoubtedly find work to compensate for the loss of benefit income but 
whether the overall level of employment will be any higher as a result is questionable.  More 
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often than not, the claimants finding work will simply fill vacancies that would have gone to 
other jobseekers, thereby transferring unemployment from one person to another. 
 
Hard evidence is limited.  A pilot study in Scotland37 found that the unemployment (JSA) 
claimant rate had fallen fastest in the local authorities where the financial losses from welfare 
reform were largest.  Closer examination, however, showed that the same areas – which 
were the places that started with the highest unemployment – also experienced the biggest 
reductions in unemployment in previous economic upturns, long before the implementation 
of welfare reform. 
 
 
The knock-on consequences for local economies 
 
The loss of income arising from welfare reform can be expected to have a negative impact 
on employment, independently of the changing financial incentive to find a job or increase 
working hours.  Many jobs are directly supported by consumer spending.  So if incomes fall 
because of welfare reform, and if this leads to in a reduction in spending, jobs are likely to be 
at risk as a result. 
 
Estimating these ‘knock-on’ consequences is not straightforward.  However, in a study on 
the impact of the pre-2015 welfare reforms on Wales we estimated that the loss of just over 
£1bn a year in income from benefits might lead to the loss of around 7,000 jobs in consumer 
services38.  There were a number of steps in this calculation: 
  The loss of income from welfare reform as a share of total disposable household 
income  
  The assumption that household spending falls in line with the reduction in income – 
which is plausible given that the reforms often affect lower-income households 
  The assumption that spending on consumer services falls in line with overall 
spending 
  The assumption that in the long-run employment in consumer services39 adjusts 
downwards to reflect lower spending 
 
Table 15 applies the same ready-reckoner – that £1bn a year loss of benefit income leads to 
7,000 job losses in consumer services – to all the GB regions.  This table looks at the 
potential impact of the financial losses arising from all the pre and post-2015 welfare 
reforms.  There will be lags in the response of employment to changes in benefit income, 
and indeed the full impact is unlikely to be felt until after 2020.  It also makes sense to look at 
the regional impacts because consumer spending tends to spill over from one local authority 
                                                          
37
 C Beatty, S Fothergill and D Houston (2015) op. cit. 
38
 C Beatty and S Fothergill (2014) The Impact of Welfare Reform on the Valleys, op. cit. 
39
 Motor trade (45), Retailing (47), Food and beverage services (56), Gambling and betting (92), 
Sports and recreation (93), Repair of household goods (95), Other personal services (96).  Numbers 
in brackets refer to industry codes in the 2007 Standard Industrial Classification. 
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to another.  In this table the regions are ranked according to the total loss per working age 
adult arising from welfare reform (see Table 8 earlier), from the worst affected (North West) 
to the least affected (South East).  The absolute numbers in Table 15 are strongly influenced 
by the size of each region. 
 
The potential job losses are not negligible.  Across Britain as a whole, approaching 200,000 
jobs in local consumer services might be lost as a result of welfare reform. 
 
It is worth emphasising, nevertheless, that these job losses are likely only over a long period 
at the same time as several other factors – wages, taxation and household borrowing for 
example – can also be expected to influence consumer spending.  Few if any businesses 
are likely to close or make redundancies solely because of the impact of welfare reform but 
the reforms are a significant factor in defining the environment in which many businesses 
operate. 
 
 
Table 15: Possible job loss in local consumer services arising from all pre and post-2015 
welfare reforms, by region 
  
Number of job 
losses 
North West  25,000 
North East 9,000 
Wales 10,000 
West Midlands 19,000 
Yorkshire and the Humber 18,000 
London 30,000 
East Midlands 14,000 
Scotland 15,000 
South West 15,000 
East 15,000 
South East 22,000 
  
 
Great Britain  190,000 
  
 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The impacts of welfare reform continue to be substantial – an estimated loss of income by 
the beginning of the next decade of almost £13bn a year as a result of the post-2015 
reforms, and cumulatively more than £27bn a year as a result of all the reforms since 2010.  
Once all the reforms have been fully implemented, this equates to an average of £690 a year 
for every adult of working age across the whole of Britain.  For some of the individuals 
affected by the changes the loss of income is much, much greater.  
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What is clear is that the financial losses arising from the reforms hit some places much 
harder than others.  At the extremes, the loss per head is three times as much in some 
places as in others. 
 
Each of the individual reforms has its own distinctive geography.  Some hit places with large 
numbers out-of-work, others where housing costs are high, some where low pay is prevalent 
and a number of the post-2015 reforms in particular hit places where large families are 
concentrated.  Taking the reforms as a whole, many of Britain’s older industrial areas, a 
number of less prosperous seaside towns and some London boroughs are hit hardest.  
Much of south and east England outside London escapes comparatively lightly. 
 
As a general rule, the most deprived local authorities across Britain are hit hardest.  A key 
effect of welfare reform is therefore to widen the gaps in prosperity between the best and 
worst local economies across the country. 
 
What is also clear is that the post-2015 round of welfare reform impacts very unevenly on 
different types of households.  It is families with dependent children, including lone parents, 
who face the largest financial losses.  And, on average, households living in the social 
rented sector can expect losses that are far bigger than those facing owner-occupiers. 
 
The net effect is that many individuals and households in the more prosperous parts of the 
country will barely notice that welfare reform is underway.  For others however, the financial 
consequences will be only too obvious. 
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APPENDIX 1: Impact of individual welfare reforms 
Housing Benefit: Local Housing Allowance – outturn to March 2016 
  Housing Benefit: LHA 
  
No of 
households affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 London  237,000 490 85 
 North West   191,000 190 43 
 North East  72,000 70 41 
 South West  126,000 130 39 
 South East  173,000 200 37 
 Yorkshire & Humber  133,000 120 35 
 Wales  73,000 70 35 
 West Midlands  115,000 120 33 
 East Midlands  91,000 90 29 
 East  105,000 110 29 
 Scotland  83,000 80 23 
     
 Great Britain  1,400,000 1,670 42 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED 
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Westminster  415 
2.  Kensington and Chelsea  255 
3.  Blackpool  185 
4.  Brent  175 
5.  Brighton and Hove  130 
6.  Hackney  120 
7.  Hastings  110 
8.  Haringey  105 
9.  Lewisham  105 
10.  Camden  100 
11.  Enfield  100 
12.  Torbay  95 
13.  Ealing  95 
14.  Wandsworth  90 
15.  Thanet  85 
16.  Bournemouth  80 
17.  Southend-on-Sea  80 
18.  Croydon  80 
19.  Tendring  80 
20.  Islington  80 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
The reforms to the Local Housing 
Allowance (LHA) element of Housing 
Benefit have impacted most where the 
private rented sector accounts for a high 
proportion of households and where rent 
levels are highest. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the biggest impact of this 
reform has fallen on London and in particular 
on boroughs such as Westminster and 
Kensington and Chelsea where rents are 
exceptionally high. 
 
A number of seaside towns have also been 
hit hard.  They too have large numbers in 
private rented housing.  Some of this 
comprises former g0uest houses that have 
been sub-divided into small flats and draw in 
low-income and out-of-work households from 
surrounding areas and further afield. 
 
Britain’s older industrial areas, hit hard by 
many of the other welfare changes, have 
been less acutely affected by the LHA 
reforms because a higher proportion of their 
low-income households live in the social 
rented sector or in lower-price owner-
occupied property. 
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Housing Benefit: Local Housing Allowance – outturn to March 2016 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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Housing Benefit: ‘bedroom tax’ – outturn to March 2016 
  Housing Benefit: ’bedroom tax’ 
  
No of 
households affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 North East  40,000 25 16 
 North West   86,000 65 14 
 Yorkshire & Humber  53,000 35 11 
 London  58,000 60 11 
 Wales  35,000 25 11 
 West Midlands  55,000 40 10 
 East Midlands  37,000 25 8 
 East  35,000 30 7 
 South West  28,000 20 7 
 South East  38,000 35 5 
 Scotland  0 0 0 
     
 Great Britain  460,000 360 9 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Knowsley  31 
2.  Liverpool  25 
3.  Copeland  25 
4.  Middlesbrough  24 
5.  St Helens  24 
6.  South Tyneside  24 
7.  Halton  23 
8.  Manchester  22 
9.  Hackney  22 
10.  Torfaen  22 
11.  Salford  22 
12.  Norwich  21 
13.  Blaenau Gwent  21 
14.  Newcastle upon Tyne  21 
15.  Lambeth  21 
16.  Southwark  21 
17.  Merthyr Tydfil  20 
18.  Wakefield  20 
19.  Sandwell  19 
20.  Allerdale  19 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
The new rules affecting under-occupation of 
social housing (widely known as the 
‘bedroom tax’) have impacted most in the 
places where a high proportion of the 
housing stock is rented from councils or 
housing associations.  These areas include 
much of older industrial Britain and a number 
of London boroughs. 
 
Older industrial areas have generally been 
hit especially hard because they mostly have 
high worklessness as well as a high 
proportion in social housing. 
 
Large parts of southern and eastern England 
have been less affected by this reform.  They 
have relatively little social housing and 
relatively few people out-of-work on benefits. 
 
In Scotland, the impact on claimants has 
been fully averted by the Scottish 
Government’s use of Discretionary Housing 
Payments. 
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Housing Benefit: ‘bedroom tax’ – outturn to March 2016 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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Non-dependant deductions – outturn to March 2016 
  Non-dependant deductions 
  
No of 
households affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 North East  16,000 11 7 
 North West   39,000 28 6 
 Yorkshire & Humber  27,000 19 6 
 West Midlands  29,000 20 6 
 Wales  16,000 11 6 
 Scotland  28,000 20 6 
 East Midlands  20,000 14 5 
 London  45,000 31 5 
 South West  23,000 16 5 
 East  24,000 17 4 
 South East  32,000 22 4 
     
 Great Britain  300,000 210 5 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Blackpool  10 
2.  Knowsley  9 
3.  Hartlepool  9 
4.  South Tyneside  9 
5.  Glasgow  8 
6.  West Dunbartonshire  8 
7.  Torbay  8 
8.  Middlesbrough  8 
9.  Tendring  8 
10.  Thanet  8 
11.  Liverpool  8 
12.  Blaenau Gwent  8 
13.  Great Yarmouth  8 
14.  Hastings  8 
15.  Hull  8 
16.  Inverclyde  8 
17.  North Ayrshire  8 
18.  Salford  8 
19.  Dundee  8 
20.  Hackney  8 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
The increase in non-dependent 
deductions, which mainly affect Housing 
Benefit entitlements, has impacted principally 
on the places with high numbers out-of-work 
on benefits. 
 
The worst affected places include Britain’s 
older industrial areas but also a number of 
seaside towns where there is not only 
unemployment but also a high proportion 
claiming Housing Benefit. 
 
A number of the less affluent London 
boroughs have also been hit relatively hard. 
 
Large parts of southern and eastern England 
outside London have been little affected by 
the increase in the deductions.  A number of 
rural areas in the North of England and in 
Scotland have also escaped relatively lightly. 
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Non-dependant deductions – outturn to March 2016 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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Benefit Cap – outturn to March 2016 
  Benefit Cap 
  
No of 
households affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 London  13,000 52 9 
 West Midlands   2,100 6 2 
 South East  2,700 9 2 
 North East  700 2 1 
 North West  2,000 6 1 
 Yorkshire & Humber  1,500 4 1 
 East Midlands  1,100 3 1 
 East  1,800 5 1 
 South West  1,100 3 1 
 Wales  800 2 1 
 Scotland  900 3 1 
     
 Great Britain  28,000 100 2 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Westminster  28 
2.  Brent  21 
3.  Ealing  17 
4.  Enfield  17 
5.  Tower Hamlets  15 
6.  Kensington and Chelsea  15 
7.  Hammersmith and Fulham  14 
8.  Haringey  14 
9.  Barking and Dagenham  11 
10.  Newham  10 
11.  Redbridge  9 
12.  Hackney  9 
13.  Waltham Forest  8 
14.  Harrow  8 
15.  Slough  8 
16.  Lewisham  8 
17.  Barnet  7 
18.  Wandsworth  7 
19.  Islington  6 
20.  Croydon  6 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
The Benefit Cap has so far impacted 
overwhelmingly on London.  All but one of 
the worst affected 20 local authorities are 
London boroughs. 
 
London has been hit hard because the pre-
2016 cap mostly comes into play for 
households that have hitherto been claiming 
large sums in Housing Benefit because of 
high rent levels. 
 
Unsurprisingly, Westminster, with the highest 
rent levels of all, has faced the biggest 
impact.  But in all parts of Britain the number 
of households affected is well down on what 
was originally expected. 
 
The pre-2016 Benefit Cap has barely 
impacted at all across large swathes of 
Britain away from London. 
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Benefit Cap – outturn to March 2016 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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Council Tax Support – outturn to March 2016 
  Council Tax Support 
  
No of 
households affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 Yorkshire & Humber  270,000 50 15 
 North West   350,000 55 12 
 West Midlands  250,000 45 12 
 London  440,000 70 12 
 North East  130,000 20 11 
 South West  170,000 35 10 
 East Midlands  190,000 30 9 
 East  200,000 35 9 
 South East  240,000 40 7 
 Wales  0 0 0 
 Scotland  0 0 0 
     
 Great Britain  2,250,000 370 9 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Blackpool  40 
2.  Wolverhampton  36 
3.  South Tyneside  32 
4.  Barking and Dagenham  31 
5.  Haringey  29 
6.  Stoke-on-Trent  29 
7.  Middlesbrough  28 
8.  Torbay  28 
9.  Walsall  27 
10.  North East Lincolnshire  27 
11.  Harlow  26 
12.  Rochdale  26 
13.  Knowsley  25 
14.  Enfield  24 
15.  Shepway  24 
16.  Peterborough  24 
17.  Leicester  23 
18.  Barnsley  23 
19.  Oldham  23 
20.  Southend  22 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam  estimates based on New Policy Institute data 
The Westminster government imposed a 10 
per cent cut in funding for Council Tax 
Support to all parts of the country.  Whether 
this had fed through to claimants has 
depended on whether it was passed on. 
 
In Scotland and Wales the devolved 
administrations chose not to pass on the cut 
to local authorities – so no impact on 
claimants there. 
 
Some local authorities in England chose not 
to pass on the reduction, in whole or in part, 
absorbing the loss by cuts elsewhere in their 
budget. 
 
So the map partly reflects political choice.  
But it also reflects the government’s 
insistence that none of the reduction is 
passed on to pensioner households, so the 
full burden of the adjustment has to fall on 
working age households. 
 
In the parts of Britain where the reductions 
have been passed on, and where there are 
large numbers of working-age claimants, the 
impact is greatest. 
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Council Tax Support – outturn to March 2016 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on New Policy Institute data 
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Personal Independence Payment – anticipated impact by 2020-21 
  Personal Independence Payment 
  
No of 
individuals affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 Wales  77,000 200 103 
 North East   59,000 150 92 
 North West 160,000 410 91 
 Scotland  122,000 320 91 
 Yorkshire & Humber  100,000 260 77 
 West Midlands  104,000 270 75 
 East Midlands  81,000 210 72 
 South West  88,000 230 68 
 East  81,000 210 56 
 South East  117,000 300 55 
 London  121,000 310 54 
     
 Great Britain  1,110,00 2,870 72 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Neath Port Talbot  154 
2.  Merthyr Tydfil  147 
3.  Knowsley  141 
4.  Blackpool  136 
5.  Blaenau Gwent  134 
6.  West Dunbartonshire  133 
7.  Caerphilly  130 
8.  Glasgow   128 
9.  Barrow-in-Furness  127 
10.  Rhondda Cynon Taf  124 
11.  Inverclyde   124 
12.  Bridgend  121 
13.  East Lindsey  121 
14.  Torfaen  120 
15.  Torbay  119 
16.  Liverpool  119 
17.  Denbighshire  117 
18.  Bolsover  117 
19.  Carmarthenshire  113 
20.  Mansfield   113 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
The replacement of Disability Living 
Allowance (DLA) by Personal 
Independence Payments (PIP) impacts 
most on the places where the number of 
claimants is greatest. 
 
The DLA claimant rate varies greatly across 
Britain, generally in line with the incapacity 
(ESA) claimant rate because most DLA 
claimants of working age are out-of-work on 
Employment and Support Allowance. 
 
The big numbers are in Britain’s older 
industrial areas.  The South Wales Valleys, 
along with industrial areas in the North and 
Scotland and a number of seaside towns, 
lose most. 
 
The financial loss in much of southern 
England, including most of London, is often 
only a quarter or a third that in the worst hit 
areas.
 
The changeover to PIP is a pre-2015 reform 
that is not expected to come to full fruition 
until 2018. 
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Personal Independence Payment – anticipated impact by 2020-21 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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Employment and Support Allowance – outturn to March 2016 
  Employment and Support Allowance 
  
No of 
individuals affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 Wales  23,000 50 25 
 Scotland   41,000 85 25 
 North East  18,000 35 22 
 North West  46,000 95 21 
 East Midlands  23,000 50 17 
 Yorkshire & Humber  26,000 55 16 
 West Midlands  28,000 60 16 
 South West  22,000 45 14 
 East  21,000 45 12 
 London  33,000 70 12 
 South East  29,000 60 11 
     
 Great Britain  310,000 650 16 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Glasgow  42 
2.  Blaenau Gwent  42 
3.  Merthyr Tydfil  38 
4.  Neath Port Talbot  36 
5.  Dundee  34 
6.  Rhondda Cynon Taf  34 
7.  Blackpool  34 
8.  Burnley  33 
9.  Inverclyde  32 
10.  Clackmannanshire  32 
11.  Knowsley  32 
12.  West Dunbartonshire  31 
13.  Caerphilly  31 
14.  Hastings  31 
15.  North Ayrshire  30 
16.  Blackburn with Darwen  30 
17.  Bridgend   29 
18.  North Lanarkshire  29 
19.  Liverpool  29 
20.  East Ayrshire  29 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
The pre-2016 reforms to incapacity benefits 
– these days Employment and Support 
Allowance – have had their biggest impact 
on Britain’s older industrial areas, where so 
many incapacity claimants are concentrated. 
 
With the exception of a couple of seaside 
towns, the list of the 20 hardest-hit 
authorities is virtually a roll-call of older 
industrial Britain. 
 
Much of southern England has escaped 
lightly. 
Since the mid-1980s, incapacity benefits 
have hidden the true scale of worklessness 
in Britain’s weaker local economies, as men 
and women with health problems or 
disabilities have claimed incapacity benefits 
instead of unemployment benefits. 
 
Across Britain as a whole, ESA claimants 
remain by some margin the largest group 
out-of-work on benefits and the reforms have 
resulted in far smaller financial savings to the 
Treasury than was originally anticipated. 
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Employment and Support Allowance – outturn to March 2016 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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Child Benefit – outturn to March 2016 
  Child Benefit 
  
No of 
households affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 London  1,040,000 480 82 
 South East   1,060,000 450 80 
 East  730,000 300 80 
 North West  900,000 340 75 
 West Midlands  710,000 270 75 
 East Midlands  560,000 220 74 
 Yorkshire & Humber  660,000 250 73 
 North East  320,000 120 72 
 Wales  370,000 140 72 
 South West  620,000 240 71 
 Scotland  620,000 240 69 
     
 Great Britain  7,600,000 3,025 76 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Elmbridge  105 
2.  St Albans  105 
3.  Hart  102 
4.  Richmond upon Thames  101 
5.  Barking and Dagenham  99 
6.  Bromley  98 
7.  Windsor and Maidenhead  97 
8.  Wokingham  96 
9.  Surrey Heath  96 
10.  Broxbourne  96 
11.  Chiltern  95 
12.  Reigate and Banstead  95 
13.  Bexley  95 
14.  Spelthorne  92 
15.  Enfield  92 
16.  Three Rivers  92 
17.  Waverley  92 
18.  South Buckinghamshire  92 
19.  Croydon  92 
20.  North Hertfordshire  91 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
The cuts to Child Benefit have had a more 
even impact across Britain than most of the 
welfare reforms – few places are more than a 
quarter above or below the national average. 
 
This is partly because the three-year freeze 
in Child Benefit rates affected all claimants – 
and most places have substantial numbers of 
children – and partly because the withdrawal 
of Child Benefit from households with a 
higher earner affected some household in 
most places.
 
The biggest impacts have been in the places 
where there are substantial numbers of 
children and a high proportion of higher 
earners.  London’s commuter belt, including 
a number of outer London boroughs, has 
been hit hardest. 
 
 53 
 
Child Benefit – outturn to March 2016 
 
 Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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Tax Credits – outturn to March 2016 
  Tax Credits 
  
No of 
households affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 North West  570,000 560 124 
 North East   210,000 200 122 
 Yorkshire & Humber  420,000 410 121 
 West Midlands  440,000 430 121 
 Wales  240,000 230 120 
 East Midlands  330,000 320 111 
 London  600,000 580 100 
 South West  340,000 330 98 
 Scotland  350,000 340 97 
 East  360,000 350 94 
 South East  470,000 460 83 
     
 Great Britain  4,400,000 4,210 106 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Blackpool  176 
2.  Blackburn with Darwen  173 
3.  Barking and Dagenham  169 
4.  Peterborough  166 
5.  Bradford  165 
6.  Burnley  163 
7.  Knowsley  162 
8.  Sandwell  161 
9.  Oldham  161 
10.  Hull  160 
11.  Pendle  160 
12.  Thanet  159 
13.  Middlesbrough  158 
14.  Leicester  158 
15.  Boston  155 
16.  Birmingham  155 
17.  Hyndburn  154 
18.  Rochdale  154 
19.  Corby  152 
20.  Stoke-on-Trent  129 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
Tax Credits – Child Tax Credit and Working 
Tax Credit – are paid to lower and middle-
income families, so the impact of reductions 
in eligibility and payment rates is felt most in 
the places where less well-off people live. 
 
The list of local authorities most affected by 
the pre-2015 changes comprises a 
combination of urban and rural areas with 
relatively low wages and in some cases large 
numbers of children. 
 
London’s commuter belt and a number of 
more prosperous rural areas have been 
affected less. 
At the regional scale, the North of England 
has lost more than the South, but overall the 
differences across Britain are less 
pronounced than for some of the other 
welfare reforms. 
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Tax Credits – outturn to March 2016 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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1 per cent uprating – outturn to March 2016 
  1 per cent uprating 
  
No of 
households affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 North East  380,000 140 81 
 North West   1,020,000 360 80 
 Wales  430,000 150 78 
 Yorkshire and the Humber  730,000 250 74 
 West Midlands  770,000 260 73 
 London  1,090,000 410 71 
 East Midlands  580,000 190 66 
 Scotland  700,000 230 66 
 South West  610,000 210 62 
 East  690,000 210 57 
 South East  940,000 290 53 
     
 Great Britain  7,900,000 2,700 68 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Blackpool  137 
2.  Hastings  110 
3.  Knowsley  110 
4.  Thanet  108 
5.  Torbay  107 
6.  Middlesbrough  107 
7.  Burnley  107 
8.  Enfield  105 
9.  Hull  103 
10.  Barking and Dagenham  103 
11.  Hartlepool  103 
12.  Blackburn with Darwen  101 
13.  Hyndburn  100 
14.  Blaenau Gwent  100 
15.  Merthyr Tydfil  99 
16.  Liverpool  98 
17.  Great Yarmouth  97 
18.  Rochdale  96 
19.  North East Lincolnshire  95 
20.  Tendring  95 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data
The 1 per cent up-rating of a wide range of 
working-age benefits inevitably impacted 
most where these benefits are claimed by 
the largest number of people. 
 
This means that places with high numbers 
out-of-work on benefits or with large numbers 
claiming Housing Benefit or in-work benefits 
were the ones hit hardest. 
 
In practice, therefore, the 1 per cent up-rating 
reinforced the local and regional impact of a 
range of other welfare reforms. 
 
Britain’s older industrial areas, a number of 
seaside towns and some London boroughs 
faced the greatest impacts. 
 
Once more, large parts of southern and 
eastern England outside London escaped 
with the smallest financial losses. 
 
 57 
 
1 per cent uprating – outturn to March 2016 
  
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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Universal Credit tapers and thresholds – anticipated impact to 2020-21 
  Universal Credit tapers and thresholds 
  
No of 
households affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 Yorkshire & Humber  300,000 320 95 
 North West   400,000 430 94 
 West Midlands  310,000 330 92 
 North East  140,000 150 90 
 Wales  160,000 170 89 
 East Midlands  240,000 260 88 
 South West  250,000 260 79 
 Scotland  240,000 260 74 
 East  260,000 270 73 
 London  400,000 430 73 
 South East  330,000 350 64 
     
 Great Britain  3,000,000 3,220 81 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Boston  139 
2.  Blackburn with Darwen  136 
3.  Bradford  135 
4.  Pendle  131 
5.  Peterborough  131 
6.  Leicester  130 
7.  Oldham  128 
8.  Blackpool  128 
9.  Barking and Dagenham  125 
10.  Burnley  123 
11.  Thanet  122 
12.  Hyndburn  122 
13.  Corby  121 
14.  Sandwell  121 
15.  West Somerset  119 
16.  Rochdale  118 
17.  Hull  118 
18.  Luton  117 
19.  Bolton  115 
20.  Torridge  114 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam  estimates based on New Policy Institute data 
Universal Credit is gradually replacing a 
range of means-tested working age benefits.  
The new tapers and thresholds increase the 
amounts withdrawn as income rises.  The 
effect is to reduce payments in places where 
in-work claimants are numerous. 
The list of local authorities most affected by 
these changes comprises a combination of 
urban and rural areas with relatively low 
wages and in some cases large numbers of 
children. 
 
London’s commuter belt and a number of 
more prosperous rural areas are affected 
less. 
 
Similar tapers and thresholds currently affect 
Tax Credits.  The change to the new rates 
occurs as claimants move across onto 
Universal Credit. 
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Universal Credit tapers and thresholds – anticipated impact to 2020-21 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on New Policy Institute data 
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Tax Credits (new reforms) – anticipated impact to 2020-21 
  Tax Credits (new reforms) 
  
No of 
households affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 West Midlands  220,000 240 68 
 Yorkshire & Humber  200,000 210 63 
 North West  270,000 280 61 
 London  300,000 340 58 
 East Midlands  160,000 160 56 
 Wales  110,000 110 55 
 North East  90,000 90 52 
 East  170,000 180 48 
 South West  150,000 150 46 
 South East  220,000 230 41 
 Scotland  150,000 140 40 
     
 Great Britain  2,000,000 2,115 53 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Blackburn with Darwen  131 
2.  Bradford  130 
3.  Barking and Dagenham  126 
4.  Newham  124 
5.  Luton  114 
6.  Birmingham  111 
7.  Leicester  111 
8.  Oldham   109 
9.  Pendle  100 
10.  Slough  98 
11.  Peterborough   98 
12.  Sandwell  98 
13.  Rochdale  91 
14.  Enfield  90 
15.  Walsall  88 
16.  Hyndburn  87 
17.  Middlesbrough  84 
18.  Burnley  84 
19.  Bolton  82 
20.  Brent   80 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
Almost two-thirds of the anticipated financial 
loss arising from the post-2015 reforms to 
Tax Credits is expected to fall on large 
families, who lose entitlement for the third 
and subsequent child born after March 2017. 
 
The places likely to lose most from the new 
reforms to Tax Credits are therefore those 
where there are normally substantial 
numbers of large families.  These include 
several towns where there is a large 
population of Asian ethnic origin. 
Where earnings tend to be higher and 
entitlement to Tax Credits is lower – across 
substantial parts of the suburban south for 
example – the new reforms to Tax Credits 
can be expected to have a smaller impact. 
 
If the reforms to Tax Credits trigger 
significant behavioural change – smaller 
families in particular – some of the financial 
loss will not occur. 
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Tax Credits (new reforms) – anticipated impact to 2020-21 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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Mortgage interest support – anticipated impact to 2020-21 
  Mortgage interest support 
  
No of 
households affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 Wales  12,000 20 9 
 North East  10,000 15 9 
 North West  25,000 35 8 
 West Midlands  17,000 25 7 
 Scotland  17,000 25 7 
 Yorkshire & Humber  17,000 25 7 
 South West  13,000 20 6 
 East Midlands  12,000 20 6 
 East  13,000 20 5 
 South East  18,000 25 5 
 London  17,000 25 4 
     
 Great Britain  170,000 255 6 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Blackpool  13 
2.  Blaenau Gwent  13 
3.  Rhondda Cynon Taf  13 
4.  Knowsley  13 
5.  Merthyr Tydfil  12 
6.  Neath Port Talbot  12 
7.  Caerphilly  11 
8.  Barrow-in -Furness  11 
9.  Inverclyde  11 
10.  Bridgend  11 
11.  Burnley  11 
12.  Tendring  11 
13.  Middlesbrough  11 
14.  North Ayrshire  11 
15.  St Helens  11 
16.  Hartlepool  11 
17.  Wirral  11 
18.  Blackburn with Darwen  10 
19.  Redcar and Cleveland  10 
20.  Hyndburn  10 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
Changing mortgage interest support from 
a welfare payment into a loan impacts most 
in the places where there is a high out-of-
work benefit claimant rate and where owner-
occupied housing also makes up a large 
proportion of the stock. 
 
The places most affected tend to be older 
industrial areas but also a handful of less 
prosperous seaside towns. 
 
Large parts of southern England, where 
worklessness is low, are little affected by this 
reform.
 
London escapes much of the impact 
because so much of its housing is rented 
rather than owner-occupied. 
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Mortgage interest support – anticipated impact to 2020-21 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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‘Pay to stay’ – anticipated impact to 2020-21 
  ‘Pay to stay’ 
  
No of 
households affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
London 26,000 80 14 
Yorkshire & Humber 20,000 25 8 
West Midlands 17,000 25 7 
East Midlands 15,000 20 7 
East 13,000 25 6 
North East 8,000 10 6 
South East 14,000 30 5 
South West 8,000 15 4 
North West  7,000 10 2 
Wales 0 0 0 
Scotland 0 0 0 
     
Great Britain  130,000 240 6 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1. Islington 34 
2. Camden 32 
3. Southwark 31 
4. Harlow 29 
5. Hackney 29 
6. Barking and Dagenham 25 
7. Stevenage 22 
8. Welwyn Hatfield 21 
9. South Tyneside 21 
10. Hammersmith and Fulham 21 
11. Dacorum 20 
12. Crawley 20 
13. Greenwich 19 
14. Norwich 19 
15. Lambeth 19 
16. Sandwell 18 
17. Westminster 18 
18. Gateshead 18 
19. Wolverhampton 17 
20. Wandsworth 17 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
‘Pay to stay’ – the new requirement on 
higher income local authority tenants to pay 
market rents – will impact most where the 
stock of council housing remains large and 
where private sector rents are well ahead of 
those in the social sector. 
 
A number of inner London boroughs face the 
largest impacts, even though the income 
threshold is set higher in London than 
elsewhere.  With a substantial stock of 
council housing, large numbers of 
households are likely to be affected and they 
each face larger losses than elsewhere 
because market rents in inner London are so 
high. 
 
If housing associations decide to use their 
discretionary power to apply ‘pay to stay’ the 
losses will be larger than those shown here, 
especially in the places where most or all of 
the council housing has undergone stock 
transfer, 
 
This reform does not apply to Scotland and 
Wales, where the management of the social 
rented sector is a devolved matter. 
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‘Pay to stay’ – anticipated impact to 2020-21 
 Source: 
Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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LHA cap in social rented sector – anticipated impact to 2020-21 
  LHA cap in social rented sector 
  
No of 
households affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 North East  17,000 15 8 
 Scotland   33,000 25 7 
 West Midlands  30,000 20 6 
 North West  37,000 30 6 
 London  47,000 35 6 
 Wales  15,000 10 6 
 Yorkshire & Humber  27,000 20 6 
 East Midlands  20,000 15 5 
 East  24,000 20 5 
 South West  20,000 15 4 
 South East  30,000 20 4 
     
 Great Britain  300,000 225 6 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  West Dunbartonshire  12 
2.  Glasgow  12 
3.  South Tyneside  11 
4.  Islington  11 
5.  Norwich  10 
6.  Knowsley  10 
7.  Hull  10 
8.  Dundee  10 
9.  Southwark  10 
10.  Hackney  10 
11.  Tower Hamlets  10 
12.  Middlesbrough  10 
13.  Inverclyde  9 
14.  North Ayrshire  9 
15.  Torfaen  9 
16.  Hartlepool  9 
17.  Blaenau Gwent  9 
18.  Clackmannanshire  9 
19.  Gateshead  9 
20.  Sunderland  9 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
Applying the Local Housing Allowance cap 
in the social rented sector, which aligns 
Housing Benefit entitlement with the 
equivalent rate in the private rented sector, 
has a complex impact. 
 
It impacts most where council and housing 
association properties are a high proportion 
of the total housing stock but also where 
rents in these properties are high relative to 
the LHA rate. 
 
In practice the areas most affected include a 
range of older industrial areas in the North 
and Scotland in particular but also several 
inner London boroughs. 
 
Large parts of southern and eastern England 
outside London, where the social housing 
sector is small, are relatively unaffected by 
this reform. 
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LHA cap in social rented sector – anticipated impact to 2020-21 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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Employment and Support Allowance (new reforms) – anticipated impact to 2020-21 
  Employment and Support Allowance (new reforms) 
  
No of 
individuals affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 Scotland  70,000 89 26 
 Wales   37,000 48 25 
 North East  28,000 36 22 
 North West  73,000 94 21 
 East Midlands  39,000 50 17 
 West Midlands  45,000 58 16 
 Yorkshire & Humber  40,000 52 15 
 South West  34,000 44 13 
 East  35,000 44 12 
 South East  47,000 60 11 
 London  51,000 66 11 
     
 Great Britain  500,000 640 16 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Glasgow  47 
2.  Blaenau Gwent  43 
3.  Merthyr Tydfil  38 
4.  Dundee  38 
5.  Neath Port Talbot  35 
6.  Clackmannanshire  34 
7.  Blackpool  34 
8.  Burnley  34 
9.  Hastings  33 
10.  Rhondda Cynon Taf  33 
11.  West Dunbartonshire  32 
12.  North Ayrshire  32 
13.  Inverclyde  31 
14.  Knowsley  31 
15.  Blackburn with Darwen  30 
16.  East Ayrshire  30 
17.  Caerphilly  30 
18.  North Lanarkshire  29 
19.  Bridgend  29 
20.  Hyndburn  29 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
Like the pre-2016 reforms to incapacity 
benefits – these days Employment and 
Support Allowance – the new reforms have 
their biggest impact on Britain’s older 
industrial areas, where so many ESA 
claimants are concentrated. 
 
With the exception of a couple of seaside 
towns, the list of the 20 hardest-hit 
authorities is again virtually a roll-call of older 
industrial Britain. 
 
Much of southern England can be expected 
to escape lightly. 
 
Since the mid-1980s, incapacity benefits 
have hidden the true scale of worklessness 
in Britain’s weaker local economies, as men 
and women with health problems or 
disabilities have claimed incapacity benefits 
instead of unemployment benefits.  Despite 
the welfare reforms of recent years, this 
continues to be the case. 
 
 69 
 
Employment and Support Allowance (new reforms) – anticipated impact to 2020-21 
  
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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Benefit Cap (extension) – anticipated impact to 2020-21 
  Benefit Cap (extension) 
  
No of 
households affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 West Midlands  21,000 55 15 
 North West   27,000 65 14 
 North East  10,000 25 14 
 Wales  11,000 30 14 
 London  50,000 85 14 
 Yorkshire & Humber  18,000 45 13 
 Scotland  16,000 40 11 
 East Midlands  13,000 30 11 
 East  15,000 40 10 
 South East  21,000 55 10 
 South West  13,000 35 10 
     
 Great Britain  210,000 495 12 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Birmingham  26 
2.  Middlesbrough  24 
3.  Blackpool  24 
4.  Blackburn with Darwen  23 
5.  Enfield  23 
6.  Knowsley  23 
7.  Brent  22 
8.  Hastings  22 
9.  Barking and Dagenham  21 
10.  Hartlepool  21 
11.  Sandwell  21 
12.  Wolverhampton  21 
13.  Slough  20 
14.  Luton  20 
15.  Ealing  20 
16.  Tendring  20 
17.  Bradford  20 
18.  Walsall  20 
19.  Manchester  20 
20.  Merthyr Tydfil  20 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
The new Benefit Cap impacts more widely 
than the pre-2016 cap, hitting far more 
households, especially outside London. 
 
The pre-2016 cap was triggered mainly by 
high Housing Benefit payments (particularly 
in London) and by large family size.  These 
remain the key, but the new lower level of the 
cap means they come into play in a wider 
range of places. 
 
All the existing capped households lose out 
financially as a result of the lower cap and an 
estimated 190,000 are added by 2020-21. 
 
Large numbers of households are affected 
by the new cap in London, but here the 
maximum loss is limited to £3,000 a year.  
Outside London the maximum loss is £6,000 
a year. The result is that far more places 
outside London figure among the worst-hit 
local authorities than was the case with the 
pre-2016 cap. 
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Benefit cap (extension) – anticipated impact to 2020-21 
 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data 
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Benefit freeze – anticipated impact to 2020-21 
  Benefit freeze 
  
No of 
households affected 
Estimated 
 loss  
£m p.a. 
Loss per  
working age adult 
£ p.a. 
 North East  380,000 200 119 
 North West  1,010,000 520 116 
 Wales  430,000 220 115 
 Yorkshire & Humber  720,000 380 111 
 West Midlands  770,000 390 110 
 London  1,080,000 630 108 
 East Midlands  580,000 290 98 
 Scotland  700,000 330 96 
 South West  620,000 300 91 
 East  690,000 320 85 
 South East  960,000 430 78 
     
 Great Britain  7,900,000 4,010 101 
    
 
WORST AFFECTED  
20 LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Loss per  
working 
age adult 
£ p.a. 
1.  Blackpool  193 
2.  Enfield  167 
3.  Barking and Dagenham  162 
4.  Middlesbrough  161 
5.  Thanet  159 
6.  Hastings  157 
7.  Knowsley  156 
8.  Torbay  154 
9.  Burnley  153 
10.  Blackburn with Darwen  152 
11.  Hull  152 
12.  Tendring  148 
13.  Bradford  147 
14.  Birmingham  146 
15.  Sandwell  146 
16.  Hyndburn  145 
17.  Brent  144 
18.  Oldham  144 
19.  Hartlepool  144 
20.  Great Yarmouth  143 
Sources: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data
Like the 1 per cent limit on the uprating of a 
wide range of working-age benefits, 
implemented for three years up to 2016, the 
new four-year Benefit freeze impacts most 
where these benefits are claimed by the 
largest number of people. 
 
This means that places with high numbers 
out-of-work on benefits or with large numbers 
claiming Housing Benefit or in-work benefits 
are again the ones hit hardest. 
 
In practice, the benefit freeze reinforces the 
local and regional impact of several other 
welfare reforms. 
 
Some of Britain’s older industrial areas, a 
number of seaside towns and less affluent 
London boroughs face the greatest impacts. 
 
Once more, it is large parts of southern and 
eastern England outside London that can 
expect to escape with the smallest financial 
losses. 
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Benefit freeze – anticipated impact to 2020-21 
Source: Sheffield Hallam estimates based on official data  
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APPENDIX 2: Details of statistical sources and methods 
 
 
Reforms announced prior to May 2015 
 
 
HOUSING BENEFIT: LOCAL HOUSING ALLOWANCE 
 
Rules governing assistance with the cost of housing for low-income households in the private rented 
sector 
 
Nature of reforms 
  Maximum rents set at 30th percentile of local rents, rather than 50th percentile, from  
2011-12  Caps on maximum rents for each property size, with 4-bed limit, from 2011-12  Abolition of £15 excess formerly retained by tenants paying below maximum LHA rent, from 2011-
12  Increase age limit for shared room rate from 25 to 35, from January 2012  Switch from 30th percentile rents to CPI indexation for LHA, from 2013-14 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£1,645m a year by 2014-15 
(Source: HM Treasury) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Total loss arising from 30th percentile, size caps and £15 excess (£1040m pa) allocated to local 
authorities on the basis of DWP estimates of the number of households affected and the average 
final loss (Source: DWP Impacts of Housing Benefit proposals: changes to LHA to be introduced 
in 2011-12) 
  Loss arising from increase in age limit for shared room rate (£215m pa) allocated to local 
authorities on the basis of estimates of the numbers losing and average loss per week in each 
authority (Source: DWP Housing Benefit equality impact assessment: increasing the shared 
accommodation rate age threshold to 35) 
  Loss arising from CPI indexation (£390m pa) allocated to local authorities on the basis of the 
number of Housing Benefit claims in the private rented sector in each authority in August 2012  
(Source: DWP) 
  Number of affected households is the number of Housing Benefit claimants within the LHA 
system in each authority in May 2014 (Source: DWP).  NB All LHA recipients affected by shift to 
CPI indexation. 
 
 
 
HOUSING BENEFIT: ‘BEDROOM TAX’ 
 
New rules governing the size of properties for which payments are made to working age claimants in 
the social rented sector (council and housing association) 
 
Nature of the reform 
  Limit Housing Benefit payments to working-age households in social rented accommodation to a 
level reflecting the number of bedrooms justified by the size and age composition of the 
household, from 2013-14  
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Total estimated loss 
 
£360m a year by 2014-15, revised down from initial HM Treasury estimate of £490m a year to reflect 
lower number of households affected than originally anticipated and the outturn financial losses per 
household 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Number of households affected in each local authority in June 2013 (Source: DWP).  No 
households are affected In Scotland because the impact has been fully offset by Discretionary 
Housing Payments. 
  Financial loss in each local authority based on number of affected households and the average 
financial loss per claimant in each authority in June 2013 (Source: DWP) 
 
 
 
NON-DEPENDANT DEDUCTIONS 
 
Deductions from Housing Benefit, Council Tax Benefit and other income-based benefits to reflect the 
contribution that non-dependant household members are expected to make towards the household’s 
housing costs. 
 
Nature of reform 
  Up-rating the deductions in stages between April 2011 and April 2014 to reflect growth in rents 
and increases in Council Tax since 2001, when the deductions were frozen, and subsequent link 
to prices 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£210m a year by 2014-15, revised down from initial estimate of £340m a year 
(Source: HM Treasury) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Estimated 300,000 claimants affected (Source: DWP Equality Impact Assessment: income-
related benefits: changes to the non-dependent deduction rates) allocated on the basis of the 
number of Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit claimants in each local authority in August 
2012 (Source: DWP). 
  Financial loss allocated to local authorities on the basis of the estimated numbers affected (see 
above) 
 
 
 
BENEFIT CAP 
 
Ceiling on total payments to out-of-work households applying to sum of wide range of working age 
benefits 
 
Nature of reforms 
  Total household benefit payments for working-age claimants capped so that workless households 
receive no more in benefit than the average weekly wage, after tax and national insurance, from 
2013-14, administered through Housing Benefit payments 
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Total estimated loss 
 
£100m a year by 2014-15, revised down from initial HM Treasury estimate of £270m a year, and later 
estimate of £185m a year, to reflect lower than anticipated number of affected households and outturn 
financial losses 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Number of households affected in each authority is the average between November 2013 and 
April 2014 (Source: DWP) 
  Average financial loss per household in each authority in April 2014 (Source: DWP) 
 
 
 
COUNCIL TAX SUPPORT 
 
Paid to households on low incomes to offset Council Tax bills, in whole or in part 
 
Nature of the reform 
  10 per cent reduction in expenditure by HM Treasury compared to previous scheme (Council Tax 
Benefit) and transfer of responsibility to local authorities, from 2013-14.  Reduction in entitlement only permitted for working-age households; entitlement of pensioner 
households fully protected.  Some local authorities in England have chosen not to pass on the reduction to claimants, in whole 
or in part, absorbing the cut within their budget.  In Scotland and Wales the devolved 
administrations have made arrangements that avoid the reduction falling on claimants. 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£370m a year in 2015-16, which is the reduction being passed on to claimants from HM Treasury’s 
estimated saving of £490m a year in 2014-15 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Number of households affected and average weekly loss, by authority, from statistics for 2015-16 
published by the New Policy Institute.  The NPI figures are based on information assembled from 
each local authority. 
  The NPI data shows that some local authorities in England have chosen not to pass on the 
benefit reduction to claimants, in whole or in part, absorbing the cut elsewhere within their budget.  
In Scotland and Wales the devolved administrations have not passed on the cut to local 
authorities, thereby avoiding any impact on claimants. 
 
 
 
PERSONAL INDEPENDENCE PAYMENTS 
 
Payments intended to help offset the additional financial costs faced by individuals of all ages with 
disabilities, including those both in and out of work 
 
Nature of reform 
  Phased replacement of Disability Living Allowance (DLA) for working-age claimants by Personal 
Independence Payments (PIP), from 2013-14  Introduction of more stringent medical test and regular re-testing  Reduction in number of payment categories 
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Total estimated loss 
 
£2,870m a year by 2017-18 
(Source: HM Treasury revised estimate, Budget 2013) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  DWP anticipate a reduction in the national caseload of working age of 600,000 (see National 
Audit Office (2014) Personal Independence Payment: early progress, NAO, London), up from an 
original DWP estimate of 450,000.  Additionally, 510,000 claimants in receipt of PIP instead of 
DLA are anticipated to experience a reduction in payment. 
  Numbers allocated on the basis of stock of working age DLA claimants in each local authority in 
February 2012 (Source: DWP). 
  Financial loss allocated to each local authority on basis of reduction in claimant numbers 
  Financial losses by 2015-16 and from 2016-17 onwards from HM Treasury (Budget 2013) 
 
 
 
EMPLOYMENT AND SUPPORT ALLOWANCE 
 
Out-of-work payments to men and women of working age with health problems or disabilities, 
(including predecessors Incapacity Benefit, Income Support on grounds of disability, and Severe 
Disablement Allowance) 
 
Nature of reforms 
  Introduction of Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) for new claimants and a new, tougher 
medical test (the Work Capability Assessment), from October 2008  Applying the Work Capability Assessment to existing incapacity claimants from autumn 2010 
onwards, and migration to ESA if not deemed ‘fit for work’  Time-limiting to 12 months non-means tested entitlement for ESA Work Related Activity Group, 
from 2012-13  New conditionality for ESA Work Related Activity Group 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£650m a year by 2015-16 comprising:  £440m a year from time limiting of non-means tested entitlement, revised down from HM 
Treasury initial estimate of £2,475m a year by 2014-15 (Spending Review 2010) and 
subsequent estimate of £1,475m a year by 2015-16 (Budget 2012) to reflect lower numbers in 
the Work Related Activity Group  £210m a year from reduction in ESA caseload 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Estimated number affected by time-limiting (210,000) based on the difference in the proportion of 
ESA claimants in the WRAG group in receipt of contributory benefits in the four quarters to 
February 2012, just prior to the introduction of time-limiting. and in the four quarters to May 2015 
(Source: DWP) 
  Net reduction in ESA caseload based on difference between the average IB/SDA caseload in the 
four quarters to August 2008, just prior to the introduction of ESA for new claimants, and the 
average combined ESA and residual IB/SDA caseload in the four quarters to May 2015. 
  Numbers affected by time-limiting allocated in proportion to the WRAG caseload in each local 
authority in May 2015 
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  Reduction in the total caseload arising from the introduction of ESA allocated in proportion to the 
IB/ESA caseload in August 2008 (Source: DWP) 
  Financial loss per affected claimant (£2,100 a year) based on DWP estimate of average financial 
loss arising from time-limiting (Source: DWP Impact Assessment: Time limit contributory 
Employment and Support Allowance to one year for those in the Work-Related Activity Group).  
There are no DWP estimates for the average financial loss for those removed from the ESA 
caseload but as some of these claimants will receive other means-tested benefits the magnitude 
of the financial losses are likely to be broadly similar. 
 
 
 
CHILD BENEFIT 
 
Paid to households on the basis of the number of children up to age 16 or, if they remain at school or 
in further education, up to 19 
 
Nature of reforms 
  Freeze benefit rates for three years from 2011-12, instead of up-rate with inflation  Withdrawal of benefit from households including a higher earner (threshold at £50,000 and taper 
to £60,000), from January 2013 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£3,025m a year by 2014-15, revised up from initial estimate of £2,845m a year 
(Source: HM Treasury) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Numbers of families in receipt of Child Benefit, by local authority in August 2011, from HMRC 
(Source: HMRC Child Benefit Statistics: geographical analysis).  NB All recipients affected by 
freeze. 
  Financial loss arising from freeze allocated on basis of number of families in receipt of Child 
Benefit in each local authority (see above) 
  Financial loss arising from withdrawal of benefit from high earners allocated on basis of number of 
families in receipt of Child Benefit multiplied by an index of median earnings in the three years 
2010, 2011 and 2012 of residents in each local authority relative to the UK average (Source: 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings).  County averages used where earnings data for districts 
is unavailable. 
 
 
 
TAX CREDITS 
 
Payments through the tax system of Child Tax Credit (CTC) and Working Tax Credit (WTC) to lower 
and middle income households 
 
Nature of reforms 
  Adjustments to thresholds, withdrawal rates, supplements, income disregards and backdating 
provisions, from 2011-12 onwards  Changes in indexation and up-rating, from 2011-12 onwards  Reductions in childcare element of WTC, from 2011-12  Increase in working hours requirement for WTC, from 2012-13 
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Total estimated loss 
 
£4,210m (net) a year by 2014-15 
(Source: HM Treasury) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Overall loss allocated on the basis of the total number of families in receipt of CTC or WTC in 
December 2014, by local authority (Source: HMRC Child and Working Tax Credits Statistics: 
geographical analysis) 
  All families in receipt of CTC or WTC affected by one or more of the changes 
 
 
 
1 PER CENT UP-RATING 
 
Annual up-rating of value of benefits 
 
Nature of reform 
  1 per cent up-rating (instead of by CPI) for three years from 2013-14 for main working-age 
benefits, and for two years from 2014-15 for Child Benefit and for Local Housing Allowance within 
Housing Benefit 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£2,700m a year by 2015-16, revised down from HM Treasury estimate of £3,430 a year to reflect 
lower outturn level of inflation 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Total loss divided equally between DWP-administrated benefits and HMRC-administrated benefits 
(Child Benefit, CTC, WTC), reflecting split of overall expenditure on relevant benefits (Sources: 
DWP and HMRC) 
  HMRC benefits loss allocated on basis of total number of families in receipt of CTC or WTC in 
December 2012, (Source: HMRC Child and Working Tax Credits: geographical analysis) 
  DWP benefits loss divided 75:25 between working age benefits and Housing Benefit, reflecting 
split of overall expenditure on relevant benefits (Source: DWP) 
  DWP working age benefits loss allocated on basis of out-of-work working age benefit numbers in 
February 2012, by local authority (Source: DWP) 
  Housing Benefit loss allocated on basis of estimated expenditure on claimants in the private 
rented sector, by local authority, derived from overall Housing Benefit expenditure data for 
2011/12 and share of claimants in the private rented sector in August 2012 (Sources: DWP) 
  Estimated 30 per cent of all households affected (Source: DWP Welfare Reform and Work Bill: 
impact assessment of the benefit rate freeze).  Allocated to local authorities in proportion to the 
sum of the numbers in receipt of Child Benefit in December 2014 and out-of-work working-age 
benefits in February 2012. 
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Reforms announced since May 2015 
 
 
UNIVERSAL CREDIT TAPERS AND THRESHOLDS 
 
Benefit withdrawal as income of Universal Credit (UC) claimant rises 
 
Nature of reforms 
  Reduction in the level of earnings at which UC awards start to be withdrawn, from April 2016  Increase in the rate at which UC awards are withdrawn from 41 per cent to 48 percent, from April 
2016 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£3,220m a year (net) by 2020-21 
(Sources: HM Treasury Summer Budget 2015 with revisions in Spending Review and Autumn 
Statement 2015) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Overall loss allocated on the basis of the total number of families in work in receipt of CTC or 
WTC in December 2015, by local authority (Source: HMRC Child and Working Tax Credits 
Statistics: geographical analysis) 
  All families in work in receipt of CTC or WTC affected by one or more of the changes 
 
 
 
TAX CREDITS (new reforms) 
 
Payments through the tax system to lower and middle income households, initially as Child Tax Credit 
and Working Tax Credit and eventually Universal Credit 
 
Nature of reforms 
  Limiting of child element to two children for new births in tax credits and new UC claims, from 
April 2017 (£1,365m a year by 2020-21)  Removal of family element in tax credits and UC, and the family premium in Housing Benefit, for 
new claims, from April 2017 (£675m a year by 2020-21)  Reduction in income rise disregard in tax credits, from April 2016 (£110m a year by 2020-21)  Uprated minimum income floor in UC for self-employed from 2016-17 (£180m a year by 2020-21)  Revised UC delivery schedule (£215m extra spending in 2020-21 but net saving in earlier years) 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£2,115m a year (net) by 2020-21 
(Sources: HM Treasury Summer Budget 2015 and Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Estimated numbers of households affected by child element (640,000) from DWP Impact 
Assessment: Tax Credits and Universal Credit, changes to Child Element and Family Element 
  30 per cent of other tax credit claimants in December 2015 (Source: HMRC) assumed to be 
affected by one or more of the other changes.  Family element is expected to affect 1,180,000 
households (Source: DWP Impact Assessment above) but there is overlap with those affected by 
the child element. 
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 65 per cent of financial loss (more than two children element) allocated on basis of number of 
families in receipt of Child Tax Credit multiplied by an index of the share of households with three 
or more dependent children in each local authority relative to the GB average in 2011 (Source: 
Census of Population). 
  35 per cent of financial loss (remaining measures) allocated on basis of numbers in receipt of tax 
credits in December 2015 (Source: HMRC Child and Working Tax Credits: geographical analysis) 
  Total numbers affected in each local authority allocated in proportion to financial losses 
 
 
 
MORTGAGE INTEREST SUPPORT 
 
Assistance with mortgage payments for out-of-work claimant 
 
Nature of the reform 
  Change from welfare payment to loan, from April 2016 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£255m a year by 2020-21 
(Source: HM Treasury Summer Budget 2015) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  170,000 households affected (Source: DWP Welfare Reform and Work Bill: impact assessment 
for converting support for mortgage interest from a benefit into a loan). 
  Number of households affected and financial loss allocated to local authorities in proportion to 
working-age benefit claimant numbers in each authority in May 2015 (Source: DWP) multiplied by 
an index of the share of households in owner-occupied housing relative to the GB average in 
2011 (Source: Census of Population) 
 
 
 
‘PAY TO STAY’ 
 
Rent levels for higher-income social housing tenants 
 
Nature of the reform 
  Social housing tenants in London with a household income of £40,000 a year or more, and 
£30,000 a year or more in the rest of England, to pay market rents from April 2017  Mandatory for local authority tenants; discretionary for housing associations 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£240m a year by 2020-21 
(Source: HM Treasury Summer Budget 2015) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  £240m a year saving to Treasury (and equivalent loss to tenants) is wholly attributable to higher 
rents in local authority housing.  If housing associations use their discretionary power to apply 
‘pay to stay’ the financial losses will be higher. 
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 Financial loss allocated in proportion to the stock of local authority housing in each authority in 
2014 (Source: CLG) multiplied by an index of the average value of Housing Benefit awards 
across four household types in the private rented sector in each authority relative to the England 
average in August 2015 (Source: DWP), and reduced by 25 per cent in London to reflect higher 
income threshold 
  200,000 households in local authority housing anticipated to be affected in 2017-18 (Source: CLG 
Housing and Planning Bill 2015/16: impact assessment).  Reduced to 130,000 households in 
2020-21 in proportion to the anticipated reduction in the financial saving to the Treasury between 
2017-18 and 2020-21 as behavioural change (right to buy, choice of tenure) takes effect (Source: 
Summer Budget 2015) 
  Affected households allocated in proportion to the financial losses multiplied by the reciprocal of 
the index above to reflect higher average losses in areas with high private sector rents. 
  Scotland and Wales are unaffected by this reform 
 
 
 
LHA CAP IN SOCIAL RENTED SECTOR 
 
Support with housing costs for social sector tenants 
 
Nature of the reform 
  Housing Benefit in the social sector limited to the equivalent private sector rate, from April 2018 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£225m a year by 2020-21 
(Source: HM Treasury Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Financial loss arising from LHA cap allocated in proportion to number of households in social 
housing claiming Housing Benefit in each local authority in August 2015 multiplied by the ratio 
between the value of the average Housing Benefit claims in the social and private rented sectors 
in August 2015 (Sources: DWP) 
  In absence of published government estimates, the number of households affected assumed to 
be 300,000 (given the Treasury’s anticipated financial saving, this equates to an average loss of 
£15 per week per household).  Numbers allocated in proportion to the financial losses. 
 
 
 
HOUSING BENEIT: 18-21 YEAR OLDS 
 
Support with housing costs for young people 
 
Nature of the reform 
  End of automatic Housing Benefit entitlement for out-of-work 18-21 year olds, from April 2017 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£40m a year by 2020-21 
(Source: HM Treasury Summer Budget 2015) 
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Methods and data sources 
  In absence of government estimates, but in line with anticipated financial saving, numbers 
affected assumed to be 15,000, equating to an average loss of roughly £50 a week 
  Number and financial losses allocated in proportion to the out-of-work claimant rate among under-
25s in each local authority in May 2015 (Source: DWP) 
 
Because of the small scale of the overall financial loss, the figures for this reform are not mapped 
separately in Appendix1 but are included in the aggregate figures. 
 
 
 
EMPLOYMENT AND SUPPORT ALLOWANCE (new reforms) 
 
Out-of-work payments to men and women of working age with health problems or disabilities 
 
Nature of the reform 
  ESA in Work-Related Activity Group reduced to JSA rate for new claims 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£640m a year by 2020-21 
(Source: HM Treasury Summer Budget 2015) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Numbers affected (500,000) from DWP Impact Assessment: remove the ESA Work-Related 
Activity Component and the UC Limited Capability for Work Element for new claims 
  Numbers affected and financial losses allocated in proportion to the numbers claiming ESA in the 
WRAG group in each local authority in May 2015 (Source: DWP) 
 
 
 
BENEFIT CAP (extension) 
 
Ceiling on total payments to out-of-work households applying to sum of wide range of working age 
benefits 
 
Nature of reform 
  New, lower ceiling set at £23,000 a year in London and £20,000 elsewhere, from 2016-17 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£495m a year by 2020-21 
(Source: HM Treasury Summer Budget 2015) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Households already capped in London (10,000) and in the rest of Britain (13,000) lose £3,000 a 
year and £6,000 a year respectively.  Numbers are averages for March-August 2015 (Source 
DWP).  Households already capped therefore lose £108m a year. 
  Remaining financial loss to newly capped households (£387m a year) expected to average £39 
per week, or £2,000 a year.  (Source: DWP Welfare Reform and Work Bill: impact assessment for 
the benefit cap).  This equates to 190,000 newly-capped households. 
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 24 per cent of all households affected by the new cap (210,000) expected to be in London and 76 
per cent elsewhere (Source: DWP Welfare Reform and Work Bill: impact assessment for the 
benefit cap).  Implies 40,000 newly-capped households in London and 150,000 elsewhere. 
  Financial loss to newly-capped households in London limited to £3,000 a year and assumed to be 
an average of £1,300 a year (£52m in total) 
  Loss of remaining £335m a year to 150,000 newly capped households outside London therefore 
estimated to average £2,230 a year 
  Number of newly capped households affected in London and in the rest of GB allocated to each 
local authority: one-third in proportion to number on out-of-work benefits in May 2015 (Source: 
DWP); one-third in proportion to the ratio between the local share of households with 3 or more 
children and the GB average in 2011 (Source: Census of Population); and one-third in proportion 
to the ratio between the local value of Housing Benefit awards and the GB average in August 
2015 (Source: DWP) 
 
 
 
BENEFIT FREEZE 
 
Below-inflation uprating of benefits 
 
Nature of reform 
  Freeze in value of most working-age benefits for four years from 2016-17 
 
Total estimated loss 
 
£4,010m a year by 2020-21 
(Source: HM Treasury Summer Budget 2015) 
 
Methods and data sources 
  Total loss divided 40:60 between DWP-administrated benefits and HMRC-administrated benefits 
(Child Benefit, CTC, WTC), reflecting the current split of overall expenditure on relevant benefits 
(Sources: DWP and HMRC) 
  HMRC benefits loss allocated on basis of total number of families in receipt of CTC or WTC in 
December 2015, (Source: HMRC Child and Working Tax Credits: geographical analysis) 
  DWP benefits loss divided 70:30 between working age benefits and Housing Benefit, reflecting 
the current split of overall expenditure on relevant benefits (Source: DWP) 
  DWP working age benefits loss allocated on basis of out-of-work working age benefit numbers in 
May 2015, by local authority (Source: DWP) 
  Housing Benefit loss allocated on basis of number claimants and average award in the private 
rented sector, by local authority (Source: DWP) 
  Estimated 30 per cent of all households affected (Source: DWP Welfare Reform and Work Bill: 
impact assessment of the benefit rate freeze).  Allocated to local authorities in proportion to the 
sum of the numbers in receipt of Child Benefit in December 2015 (Source: HMRC) and out-of-
work working-age benefits in May 2015 (Source: DWP). 
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Allocation of post-March 2016 financial loss by household type 
 
 
Personal Independence Payment (post-March 2016 impact of pre-2015 reform) 
  Allocated in proportion to the number of households of each type claiming PIP predecessor 
Disability Living Allowance (Source: Family Resources Survey, with adjustments to match FRS 
data for ‘benefit units’ to Census data for ‘household types’ and to allow for the possibility that 
more than one individual in the same household is affected) 
 
 
Universal Credit tapers and thresholds 
  Allocated in proportion to the number of households of each type claiming Tax Credits (Source: 
Family Resources Survey, with adjustments as above).  UC tapers and thresholds apply to 
households that would previously have claimed Tax Credits. 
 
 
Tax Credits (new reforms) 
  Child element allocated in proportion to numbers of households with two or more dependent 
children.  Impact on non-couples reduced by 50 per cent and re-allocated proportionally to 
couples. 
  Family element allocated in proportion to numbers of households with dependent children 
  Remainder allocated in proportion to numbers of households in receipt of Tax Credits (Source: 
Family Resources Survey, with adjustments as above) 
 
 
Mortgage Interest Support 
  45 per cent of households affected are of pension age (Source: DWP Welfare Reform and Work 
Bill: impact assessment for converting support for mortgage interest from a benefit into a loan).  
Allocated in proportion to numbers of pension-age households. 
  50 per cent of households affected have dependent children (Source: DWP Welfare Reform and 
Work Bill: impact assessment for converting support for mortgage interest from a benefit into a 
loan).  Allocated in proportion to numbers of households with dependent children. 
  Remaining 5 per cent allocated in proportion to numbers in other household types, excluding 
students 
  Financial loss allocated in proportion to estimated number of households affected 
 
 
‘Pay to stay’ 
  Households above pension age and student households assumed to be unaffected 
  Nominal 4,000 allocated to each of: lone parents with one dependent child, lone parents with two 
or more dependent children, and single-person working age households.  These are household 
types with few likely to be above the income threshold. 
  Remaining affected households allocated into three broad groups in proportion to social housing 
profile (Source: English Housing Survey 2013-14), then further divided in each group in proportion 
to the numbers of households of each type across GB 
  Financial loss allocated in proportion to estimated number of households affected  
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LHA cap in social rented sector 
  Number of affected households allocated in proportion to social housing profile, using England as 
a guide to GB (Source: English Housing Survey 2013-14), then further divided in each group in 
proportion to the numbers of households of each type across GB.  This assumes all household 
types in social housing (except pensioners – see below) are equally affected because LHA rates 
reflect household type.  Student households assumed to be unaffected. 
  Number of affected pensioner households reduced by 50 per cent to reflect higher incidence of 
exempt sheltered housing and lower rate of new tenancies, and reallocated proportionally to other 
household types. 
  Financial loss allocated in proportion to estimated number of households affected 
 
 
Housing Benefit: 18-21 year olds 
  Number of affected households assumed to be split equally between ‘single working age’ and 
‘other’ 
  Financial loss allocated in proportion to estimated number of households affected 
 
 
Employment and Support Allowance (new reforms) 
  Allocated in proportion to the number of households of each type claiming ESA or its predecessor 
incapacity benefits (Source: Family Resources Survey, with adjustments as above). 
 
 
Benefit Cap (extension) 
  59 per cent of households affected are expected to be female lone parents (Source: DWP 
Welfare Reform and Work Bill: impact assessment for the benefit cap).  Adding male lone 
parents, 66 per cent of all affected households are assumed to be lone parents. 
  60 per cent of lone parents affected are assumed to have two or more dependent children.  The 
Benefit Cap is more likely to apply to larger families with higher entitlement. 
  5 per cent of households affected assumed not have dependent children.  Allocated in proportion 
to stock of households without dependent children (excluding pensioners and students). 
  Remaining affected households split 60/40 between households with two or more dependent 
children and households with one, and allocated in proportion to number of each type 
  Financial loss allocated in proportion to estimated number of households affected 
 
 
Benefit freeze 
  Allocated in proportion to the number of households of each type claiming relevant benefits 
(Source: Family Resources Survey, with adjustments as above). 
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Allocation of post-March 2016 financial loss by housing tenure 
 
  Losses arising from PIP and ESA allocated to each tenure on the basis of number of households 
claiming PIP/DLA and ESA/IB (Source: Family Resources Survey) 
  Losses arising from UC tapers and thresholds and from Tax Credit changes allocated to each 
tenure on the basis of number of households claiming Tax Credits (Source: Family Resources 
Survey) 
  Loss arising from benefit freeze allocated to each tenure on the basis of number of households 
claiming income-related benefits (minus Pension Credit) (Source: Family Resources Survey) 
  Loss arising from Benefit Cap extension allocated 54/46 between the social rented and private 
rented sectors on the basis of the number of households in each sector affected by the pre-2015 
cap in November 2015 (Source: DWP) 
  Loss from ‘pay to stay’ and new LHA cap in social rented sector confined to social housing 
  Loss from mortgage interest support confined to owner-occupied sector 
  Loss from new Housing Benefit rules for 18-21 year olds split evenly between the social and 
private rented sectors, guided by data on single unemployed 18-21 year olds with no dependent 
children claiming Housing Benefit (Source: DWP) 
  100 per cent of the loss from PIP, UC tapers and thresholds, 18-21s and ESA, 35 per cent of the 
loss from Tax Credits, 60 per cent of the loss from the Benefit Cap and 75 per cent of the loss 
from the benefit freeze allocated to the social rented sector (SRS) in each local authority by the 
formula: 
 
Local loss (£m) multiplied by national share of loss from each reform in SRS multiplied by 
(local share of households in SRS divided by GB share of households in SRS) 
(Source: 2011 Census of Population) 
  To take account of the impact on low-income large families and local variation in their distribution 
by tenure, 65 per cent of the loss from Tax Credits, 40 per cent of the loss from the Benefit Cap 
and 25 per cent of the loss from the benefit freeze allocated to the SRS in each authority by the 
formula: 
 
Local loss (£m) multiplied by local share of households with 3 or more dependent children 
living in SRS and claiming Housing Benefit 
(Sources: 2011 Census of Population and DWP) 
  Loss by local authority from ‘pay to stay’ and LHA cap in social rented sector added to loss In 
SRS (see earlier) 
  Total number of households and number of working-age households, by sector for GB and each 
local authority, from 2011 Census of Population 
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